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Abstract 
New digital technologies are rapidly changing the global economy and have connected billions of 
people in deterritoralised social network. Will they also create new opportunities for global citizenship 
and alternatives to state-based political communities? In his kick-off essay, Liav Orgad takes an 
optimistic view. Blockchain technology permits to give every human being a unique legal persona and 
allows individuals to associate in ‘cloud communities’ that may take on several functions of territorial 
states. 14 commentators discuss this vision. Sceptics assume that states or business corporations have 
always found ways to capture and use new technologies for their purposes. They emphasise that the 
political functions of states, including their task to protect human rights, require territorial monopolies 
of legitimate coercion that cannot be provided by cloud communities. Others point out that individuals 
would sort themselves out into cloud communities that are internally homogenous which risks to 
deepen political cleavages within territorial societies. Finally, some authors are concerned that digital 
political communities will enhance global social inequalities through excluding from access those who 
are already worse off in the birthright lottery of territorial citizenship. Optimists see instead the great 
potential of blockchain technology to overcome exclusion and marginalisation based on statelessness 
or sheer lack of civil registries; they regard it as a tool for enhancing individual freedom, since people 
are self-sovereign in controlling their personal data; and they emphasise the possibilities for 
emancipatory movements to mobilise for global justice across territorial borders or to create their own 
internally democratic political utopias. In the boldest vision, the deficits of cloud communities as 
voluntary political associations with limited scope of power could be overcome in a global 
cryptodemocracy that lets all individuals participate on a one-person-one-vote basis in global political 
decisions. 
Keywords 
Global citizenship; Digital technology; Blockchain; Cloud community; Virtual democracy; Legal 
persona 
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 1 
Cloud Communities: The Dawn of Global Citizenship? 
Liav Orgad*1 
The idea of global citizenship 
About 70 years ago, an American peace activist named Garry Davis created a registered concept of 
‘world citizenship.’ A naïve enterprise at its infancy, this concept looks more realistic today for three 
reasons. The first reason is global interconnectedness. The internet has profoundly changed the notion 
of public space. About 50 per cent of the world population uses the internet and global internet use is 
consistently growing – from 16 per cent in 2005 to 48 per cent in 2017. 71 per cent of the world’s 
youth population (15-24) uses the internet, 94 per cent in the developed world.
2
 2.3 billion people use 
smartphones, almost one-third of the global population. Facebook and WeChat in China have an 
estimated 3 billion users together. Internet technologies and cloud computing enable people to 
establish digital IDs, which could eventually become recognised as an international legal personality, 
be connected with one another, disentangled from physical borders, and act at a distance. 
The second reason is identity. Ever since Aristotle, membership in a political community denotes 
an identity of some kind. Shared identity is a cornerstone of citizenship – it creates a sense of 
community and a commitment toward a common good.
3
 While the idea of global citizenship goes 
back to ancient Greece – the Greek philosopher Diogenes is credited to be the first to define himself as 
‘a citizen of the world’4 – it is only in recent years that a transformation of consciousness from local to 
global identities has been identified. Recent polls reveal that people are increasingly identifying 
themselves as global, rather than national, citizens. For example, a 2016 BBC World Poll shows that 
56 per cent of the respondents consider themselves, first and foremost, as ‘global citizens,’ rather than 
national citizens.
5
 A 2016 World Economic Forum Survey indicates that the vast majority of young 
people identify themselves first as ‘human’ (40.8 per cent) and ‘citizens of the world’ (18.6 per cent), 
while national identity only comes third (13 per cent).
6
 National identity remains central, but, 
particularly in emerging economies, a perception of global social identity is on the rise.
7
 For the first 
time in history, a large percentage of the world’s population places global identity above any national 
or local identities; there is a growing sense of a global community that transcends national borders. 
The third reason is responsibility, a central component of a republican conception of citizenship. In 
a republican view, members of a political community share public responsibilities to promote a 
common good and confront common challenges. Today, more than ever, human beings face common 
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global challenges and human activities have a cumulative effect on the global scale.
8
 Although there 
are no global individual responsibilities, at least not in the legal sense, private individuals are 
increasingly showing global responsibility in different policy areas (food consumption, global 
warming, animal rights) by taking actions (e.g., buying organic food, recycling, becoming a 
vegetarian) based on free choice and without state coercion. Some of the global challenges have 
become urgent and cannot be adequately addressed on the national level. By showing global 
responsibility, even if limited and with a weak sense of agency, individuals are participating in 
activities whose scope and target audience go beyond national boundaries. The changing public 
opinion thus goes hand in hand with changes in individual actions motivated by a sense of global 
political responsibilities. 
Status: international legal persona 
Under the current structure of international law, individuals exist as legal persons only through a status 
conferred to them by a state. Individuals are citizens or residents of some state; an international legal 
status of a ‘human being’ is non-existent.9 True, international law speaks in universal terms of 
international human rights law, even natural rights, but it makes them largely dependent on citizenship 
and territorial sovereignty, as if a person only legally exists through a state – a feudalist approach.10 
This state of affairs raises three issues. First, human rights: an estimate of 1.1 billion people, 15 per 
cent of the world population, lacks an official identification.
11
 Without a national identification, one 
cannot have access to basic services and participate in modern life; one lacks, as coined by Hannah 
Arendt, the ‘right to have rights’. For refugees and displaced persons, having no national identity can 
lead to detention and deportation. But even people with a national ID may wish to have a universal ID 
that allows them to choose an identity free of state limitations (think of national restrictions on gender 
identity, sexual orientation, and names). The legal source for an international legal personality can be 
found in Article 6 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, according to which ‘Everyone has 
the right to recognition everywhere as a person before the law’ (also Article 16, ICCPR).12 
The second issue is lack of self-governance. Existing citizenship regimes are based on Westphalian 
sovereignty under which citizens govern their life indirectly – through the state.13 This means that the 
status of citizenship perpetuates the monopoly of the state to control the exercise of individual rights. 
On the national level, the exercise of rights is connected with the status of citizenship (though less 
today than in the past);
14
 on the transnational level, following the development of a standard travel 
document, the passport, the exercise of freedom of movement outside the state has become connected 
with citizenship (perhaps more so today than in the 18th and 19th centuries).
15
 It also means that the 
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participation of individuals in international law-making, even in decisions that directly affect them, is 
only realised through state representatives and depends a great deal on who is included in the 
boundaries of the demos. Minorities that have minimal political influence or no citizenship rights 
remain unheard in international decision-making, and so are people who are ineligible to vote in 
national elections due to electoral law restrictions and citizens in authoritarian regimes.
16
 The actual 
influence of individuals in the creation of international law is infinitesimally small. 
The third issue is unequal representation. Since the 17th century, the Westphalian concept of 
sovereignty has been based upon two fundamental ideas that have marched together – nation-states 
and territories – accompanied by a third idea, equality: the notion that sovereign states are equal.17 The 
Peace of Westphalia ended the medieval hierarchical system of power among rulers – though not 
among humans – and replaced it with a system of territorial sovereignty and sovereign equality of 
states (this idea is recognised today in Article 2(1) to the UN Charter).
18
 Unlike sovereign states, 
individuals do not have an equal voice in international affairs. International law is organised on a ‘one-
state, one-vote’ basis – a system that creates disparities in individual voting power. Citizens of San 
Marino (33,000 people) have the same voting power in the UN as citizens of India (1.2 billion). The 
disparity in individual voting power in governance of global issues (e.g., global warming and the 
environment) undermines the equal value of citizenship under international law. 
Digital identity: blockchain technology 
The UN Sustainable Development Goals recognise the importance of legal identity for all. Article 16.9 
aims to ‘provide legal identity for all, including birth registration’ by 2030. Through the ID4D 
program, the World Bank assists in the promotion of the UN goal by financially assisting states to 
provide recognised IDs.
19
 
The internet already offers the infrastructure for the realisation of digital IDs, yet new technologies, 
e.g. blockchain, are likely to bring further improvements necessary to turn the idea into reality. The 
internet is a system of interconnected computer networks, which allows for exchange and transfer of 
data. All present major internet applications are structured in a client-server application, where the 
participants access it via an app or a web browser (client) and the company providing the application 
runs the computations and data on their own computers (server). This structure gives these companies 
(and governments) total control over the service they provide and all the data produced by its users. 
Blockchain technology offers the first internet applications that works differently; it is designed as a 
peer-to-peer system that is not controlled by a central entity and in which data exchange is not stored 
in a single physical location. On the blockchain, shared data are hosted by all the computers in the 
network simultaneously and are publicly accessible to all. Blockchain technology is a game changer; it 
can provide people with self-sovereign identity – they are the ones who create and register their 
identity and they are the only ones who control what to do with it and with whom to share what. In 
such a decentralised system, one’s identity is not owned by a central server (Facebook, LinkedIn, a 
state ministry), but by the person herself; she can decide which data to share and for what purpose. 
Hence, blockchain technologies can help achieving the UN goal of granting an ID to everyone, not just 
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to those who can obtain it from a state, in a decentralised way that is not necessarily controlled by the 
UN or by states. 
Several organisations are currently working on the creation of the technological infrastructure 
required for a trustworthy global digital ID.
20
 The achievement of this goal involves some challenges: 
who will register people for a global ID? What will be the relation between a global ID and a national 
ID – will the global ID rely on national registries or be independent? When will a global ID be created 
– at birth, or at later age when the person can exercise control? Which details will be included – only a 
birth certificate, or also physical characteristics and biometric data? Will there be a standard form? 
Will the possession of a global ID be a right, or also a duty? How to create digital IDs for people in 
places where the required technology does not exist or in authoritarian regimes that restrict their 
subjects’ access to information technology? How to create an ID that is immune to identity theft and 
fake identities? These are important questions, but the very idea of a global digital identity for 
everyone, giving all people a legal status as a ‘human being,’ is no longer a far-fetched possibility. 
A global ID is not a status of citizenship – nor does it create, in and of itself, an international legal 
status, although it is a prerequisite for it. Yet, in my view, this is not supposed to be its main purpose. 
An international legal persona should not be seen as a replacement of national citizenships but rather 
as a status and identity complementary to national citizenships (it is thus not identical to cosmopolitan 
visions of global citizenship)
21
. It is a legal concept that will provide everyone with a global unique ID 
of a ‘human being.’ This status will be the default lifelong identity and membership for every person, 
which cannot be waived or withdrawn, and on top of it individuals will have other forms of 
membership, such as national citizenship.
22
 
Political participation: ‘Cloud Communities’ 
Imagine that every person has a trustworthy unique international legal persona; what are we going to 
do with it? The range of applications is enormous. The question is not only which functions are 
technologically possible, but which ones are normatively desirable, i.e., which values should be 
achieved by using technology? 
In international law, a ‘state’ possesses four qualities: a permanent population, a defined territory, 
government, and a capacity to enter into relations with other states (Article 1, Montevideo Convention, 
1933)
23. International law does not recognise the concept of a ‘virtual state,’ yet existing virtual 
communities, such as Bitnation (https://bitnation.co/) – a decentralised borderless virtual nation that 
functions as a government service platform – challenge the definition of a ‘state,’ and raise the 
question of why some of the institutional functions of the state, for which it was first established, 
cannot be effectively served also by a virtual political community?
24
 Can we interpret a ‘defined 
territory’ to include cyberspace, or instead talk of ‘state-like’ non-territorial polities? 
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The concept of an international legal persona will enable individuals to establish ‘Cloud 
Communities’ of different kinds. Conceptually, cloud communities have traditional characteristics of 
political communities, but not necessarily a physical territory. The communal bond can be global in 
nature – such as a shared concern about climate change, ageing, veganism and animal rights (i.e., a 
universal community, open to everyone) – or ascriptive, such as a Jewish / Bahá'í faith / Diasporic 
Cloud Nations, a form of ‘transnational nationalism’ (i.e., a selective community, open only to certain 
members). It can be thematic or geographic – region, country, state, city, village – based on a shared 
interest or territorial identity, even if not corresponding to existing borders or legally recognised 
communities. Membership is based on consent; a person can be a member of several communities or 
none. The goal varies, but my focus is political communities. Cloud communities are not social 
networks, but political communities whose aim is political decision-making and in which individuals 
take part in a process of governance and the creation of law. The legal source for it can be Article 
25(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), according to which ‘every 
citizen shall have the right and the opportunity … to take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly 
or through freely chosen representatives.’ Such a community may function in four areas: law 
(constitution, membership acquisition, registry), governance (political institutions, diplomacy, 
international agreements, taxes), welfare services (education, healthcare, social security), and 
economy (trade, corporate activities, fees). It can provide an ID registry, a dispute resolution system, 
collaborative decision-making, a virtual bank, and a voting system. In a sense, religions are a form of 
‘cloud communities’: virtual and borderless, but not voluntary and decentralised. 
Procedurally, cloud communities can be established in two ways. A top-down community can be 
set up by an international organisation, such as UN organs, as an advisory body to an existing UN 
organ (WHO, FAO, UNESCO), or in policy areas of global importance (the 17 UN Sustainable 
Development Goals is a good start). A bottom-up community can be set up by any number of 
international legal personas on a topic of common interest; as time passes by and the community 
reaches a certain numerical threshold, it can apply for a ‘Consultative Status’ at the UN (Article 71, 
UN Charter
25
). As in other mechanisms of advisory decision-making (e.g., advisory referendum), the 
outcome may become politically, even if not legally, binding. 
Cloud communities are not a replacement for the state, but they offer global citizens sharing a 
common goal, interest, or identity new ways of interacting and collaborating with each other; they are 
‘state-like’ entities.  
The future of citizenship: dynamic and multilayered? 
In today’s world, one is a participating member in multiple political communities, each of which has 
different functions and comes with a different set of rights and duties. Citizenship is multilayered.
26
 It 
is, for example, national and supranational, as demonstrated by European Union citizenship or – quite 
differently – an African Union passport.27 It can be territorial and digital, as demonstrated by e-Estonia 
(https://e-estonia.com/), the first digital residency program in the world. In the blockchain-based 
digital society of e-Estonia, everyone can acquire e-residency in Estonia in order to access its digital 
governmental services; e-residents can establish a business in Estonia, register a company, participate 
in an e-school, open a bank account, and have an Estonian digital ID (e-residents are not entitled to 
physical residency in Estonia unless they fulfil the regular visa requirements – thus, they are e-
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residents without physical residency rights.) In July 2017, there were more e-residents than newborns 
in Estonia
28
 and the country is planning is to reach 10 million e-residents by 2025, which will make its 
virtual population almost ten times larger than its territorial population (1.3 million in 2017). 
Existing attempts to create ‘cloud communities’ – such as Bitnation and e-Estonia – already offer 
non-territorial forms of political membership, remodel the way people think about sovereignty, and 
challenge the definition of the state as we know it – as a legal entity that must have a physical territory 
and a centralised governance.
29
 Citizenship, à la Bitnation and e-Estonia, resembles a business model 
where states are service providers and ‘citizens’ are billed for the service – from education to 
healthcare to infrastructure. In this model, there is no lifetime membership but fixed membership 
contracts, which can be renewed or become permanent. 
If we had to design a new international legal system, given today’s political and technological 
conditions, would it be like the current system? The world is ready, more than ever before, for 
realising of one of the most morally-desirable notions in human history – global citizenship 
(Weltbürgerschaft) without a world state, as envisioned by Immanuel Kant in 1795. Such a vision is an 
addition to, and an improvement of the existing citizenship regimes that evolved in a completely 
different era. Are we ready to embrace the global citizenship that new technologies offer to us? 
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Citizenship in Cloud Cuckoo Land? 
Rainer Bauböck
* 
We are in the midst of a digital revolution that could transform societies worldwide as profoundly as 
the agrarian revolution of the Neolithic age and the industrial revolution of the 19th century did. No 
doubt, new technologies will also deeply affect the structure and boundaries of political communities 
and the meaning of citizenship. Liav Orgad tells a hopeful story about the benefits of blockchain 
technology. It can serve to create an international legal identity for every human being and new forms 
of non-territorial political community in which citizenship is based entirely on consent. I share 
Orgad’s sense of excitement about the speed and depth of change that we are witnessing. But I am less 
optimistic about the future of citizenship.  
The progressive potential: providing global legal status and enabling global civil society 
Orgad’s first suggestion is that digital technologies will make it possible to provide every human being 
with an international legal persona, a ‘default lifelong identity and membership for every person, 
which cannot be waived or withdrawn’ (original emphases). This would indeed be a major 
achievement. In less developed countries and autocratic regimes, millions of births are not registered. 
Unregistered persons are de facto stateless and cannot claim services or rights from governments that 
do not recognise them as nationals.
1
  
Yet blockchain, the technology that he sees as most promising for this task, is not a tool to improve 
governments’ administrative capacities. It is a decentralised ledger that is not under the control of any 
government or corporation. Individuals control themselves what their registered identity is (e.g. their 
chosen gender) and who gets access to their linked data (such as health or education records). This is 
why Orgad sees in blockchain technology a potential ‘to provide people with self-sovereign identity’ 
(original emphasis). 
There is an obvious tension between these two goals: providing every human being with an 
unalterable and unique identity, on the one hand, and providing them with sovereign control over their 
identity related data, on the other hand. Births and deaths must be registered by someone else than the 
individuals concerned. Presumably adult individuals, too, are constrained in their choices because they 
must not opt out by deleting their international legal identity or subvert the global registry by assuming 
that of another person. More importantly, governments will not be out of business. Even if the act of 
registration is certified in a decentralised ledger, governments must recognise it in order for 
individuals to enjoy legal statuses and rights that only states can grant. 
Orgad seems to be aware of this tension when he writes that a global ID is not a status of world 
citizenship and that it would supplement rather than replace national citizenships assigned by 
governments. But he also wants to put it to uses that would undermine the international system of 
sovereign states as we know it. When Orgad suggests that all individuals could be represented equally 
in making international law, he must have some form of global federal democracy in mind, e.g. a 
‘peoples’ assembly’ enjoying co-legislative powers with a body in which each state has one vote, as in 
the UN General Assembly.
2
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His main vision is, however, the emergence of alternative forms of political community at the sub-
global level: cloud communities or virtual nations that individuals can join based on shared concerns 
or ascriptive identities that transcend the territorial boundaries of states. Orgad envisages two ways 
how these communities can come about: bottom up or top down. People concerned about global social 
justice could form cloud communities promoting this goal, whereas others may want to join a global 
ethnic or religious diaspora. The UN could initiate cloud communities that support its development or 
climate change goals, but also states or regions could set them up to empower their diasporas.  
To me, these applications of cloud communities look like an expansion of civil society, of 
international organisations, or of traditional territorial polities into cyberspace, rather than like 
genuinely new forms of political community. If this is what they are, then cloud communities could 
provide great opportunities. They could mobilise individuals across the world for goals of global 
justice or climate protection. And they would provide new spaces for civil society in states that 
suppress individual liberty and oppress ethnic or religious minorities. I imagine that states and global 
corporations, even if they cannot control the underlying blockchain registries, will find ways to 
instrumentalise or hijack cloud communities for their own purposes, as they already do with the 
internet and social media. Autocrats have done so with new communication technologies ever since 
the invention of the printing press. Yet this is not my main worry. It would be wrong as well as futile 
to reject new technologies that enhance individual freedom because they can also be used to constrain 
it. 
The threat to democracy: should we be ruled by voluntary associations? 
My main worry is that cloud communities may provide new global spaces for citizenship as civic 
participation while undermining its foundation as equal membership in territorial polities. This tension 
emerges from contrasting mechanisms for determining membership in civil society and in political 
communities. Civil society is the realm of voluntary association in between the involuntary 
associations of families, firms and states.
3
 In contrast with a global ID, which would register another 
form of involuntary membership, that of belonging to the human species, cloud communities must be 
voluntary associations. Individuals sort themselves into such communities by applying for 
membership or opting out while communities enjoy collectively powers to determine the conditions 
for admission. A vibrant sphere of voluntary associations is an essential element of democratic 
citizenship. And in an increasingly interconnected world it is indeed highly desirable to expand civil 
society so that individuals can act as global citizens in voluntary associations that pursue global 
agendas. 
But they can do so only because and insofar as they have a secure territorial citizenship that 
protects their fundamental rights and makes them equal members of a political community that most 
of them have not chosen to belong to. The social contract metaphor that has informed liberal thinking 
about citizenship since Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau is misleading in this respect. Citizenship as a 
legal status of membership in a territorial polity has never been based on consent. Citizenship in 
today’s states is generally acquired at birth – either through birth in the territory or descent from 
citizen parents. Immigrants may opt in through applying for naturalisation but – as the word itself 
signals – they join a birthright community. Emigrants may opt out through renouncing their 
nationality, but they can generally do so only if they have already resided abroad for some time and 
have acquired another citizenship. The non-voluntary nature and automatic acquisition of citizenship 
are even stronger at local and regional levels. Local citizenship is, or should be, generally based on 
residence rather than birth. By taking up residence in another municipality I become a local citizen and 
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acquire rights to be represented in local government. In an increasing number of democracies this 
principle of ius domicilii is also extended to foreign nationals who are granted voting rights in local 
elections.
4
 Finally, regional citizenship in federal states or supranational unions is automatically 
derived from nationality. I am a citizen of the province of Lower Austria and a citizen of the European 
Union because I am an Austrian national. Birthright, residence and derivation are three 
complementary ways how territorial polities determine who their citizens are.
5
 None of them is based 
on voluntary association.  
But why should we not see cloud communities building on blockchain technology as finally 
realising the social contract ideal by enabling us to shed the coercive straightjacket of nonvoluntary 
citizenship and transforming all political communities into voluntary associations? My response is that 
this would be fatal for democracy. Already Aristotle knew that, unlike families, democratic polities are 
association of diverse individual. These have only one thing in common: a shared destiny that links the 
freedom and well-being of each to the collective freedom and good of all. The territorial bases and 
automatic attribution mechanisms of citizenship create political community among individuals that 
differ profoundly in their interests, identities and ideas about the common good. Democracy is a set of 
institutions and procedures that provide solutions to collective action problems and legitimacy for 
coercive government exercised over a set of individuals who have been thrown together in a territory 
instead of having chosen each other in a voluntary association. 
Voluntary associations in civil society and territorial democracies are thus based on categorically 
different membership principles. Cloud communities could strengthen democratic citizenship if they 
contribute to expanding civil society to global scale. They would, however, undermine democracy if 
they took over the provision of public goods and functions of coercive government from territorial 
polities. Imagine what kind of cloud communities would be formed if these enjoyed powers similar to 
today’s states. Individuals would sort themselves out into like-minded sets just as they do in the echo 
chambers of today’s social media networks. The rich would form non-territorial polities that provide 
them with the best medical, educational and private security services worldwide without taxing them 
to finance adequate services also for the local poor. The dreams of nationalists of matching 
ethnocultural with political boundaries would finally come true if the latter are no longer territorial 
since, unlike territory, voluntary association is not a scarce resource. The boundaries of political 
communities would be constantly reshaped in efforts to get rid of minorities or lower classes who have 
become redundant in a digitalised economy. 
This is in my views a dystopian rather than a utopian scenario. I do not think it is likely to happen 
any time soon, because states are powerful beasts that have been skilful in adapting to technological 
revolutions and using them for their purposes. I also think that most individuals are attached to 
territorial democracy and citizenship and will fight back politically against what they regard as 
excesses of globalisation. Unfortunately, they do so today often through voting for populist parties and 
politicians that promote an illiberal transformation of democracy. The task for liberal democrats is to 
strengthen the integration of territorial democracies by bridging the cleavage between mobile and 
globally oriented populations, on the one side, and immobile ones that experience a shrinking of their 
opportunities and life-worlds, on the other side.  
But maybe this is a period of transition and the next generations of digital natives will be much 
more footloose than today’s sedentary majorities? A combination of a steep rise in global mobility 
with digital technologies empowering non-territorial political communities may make preserving 
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territorial democracy and citizenship a hopeless goal. Individuals’ primary political allegiances would 
then no longer be to a community of citizens rooted in a particular territory but to their self-selected 
cloud community. It may happen, but democracy would then separate individuals living next to each 
other instead of uniting them as equal citizens in spite of their differences. This is not going to be 
Aristophanes’ cloud cuckoo land. 
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Citizenship in the Era of Blockchain-Based Virtual Nations  
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In the last decades, modern democracies have been witnessing a low rate of political participation and 
civic engagement with existing governmental institutions. Low voter turnout, especially with younger 
generations, is raising significant concerns for many representative democracies, and trust in public 
institutions has dropped to a point that it has become difficult for people to engage in political 
activity.
1
  
Civic participation is not dead, however, it is only shifting to a new space. With the advent of 
internet and digital technologies, citizens of the world are coalescing into increasingly globalized 
social movements,
2
 paving the way for new forms of political engagement.
3
 With the blockchain, these 
individuals could find new ways to spontaneously organize and coordinate themselves into 
transnational ‘cloud communities’, and – as Liav Orgad suggests – even acquire their own self-
sovereign identity that subsists independently of any nation-state. Those, I believe, are some of the 
most compelling developments of blockchain technology, which I have been following closely over 
the past few years.  
But what makes blockchain technology a powerful tool for promoting disintermediation and 
decentralized coordination – i.e. a trustless technology – also constitute one of its greatest limitations, 
especially when it comes to political deliberation. While politics is about reaching a compromise 
between conflicting interests and values, blockchain technology operates via distributed consensus and 
an exit-based conflict resolution system. As underlined by Rainer Bauböck, relying on voluntary cloud 
communities as a means to govern society could significantly increase inequalities, leading to an 
overall loss of democratic representation and wealth redistribution. 
In a sense, I agree with both Orgad and Bauböck. When brought to an extreme, blockchain 
technology could create – simultaneously – a utopian society characterized by greater individual 
freedom and autonomy, and a dystopian society driven by market-based incentives and self-dealing. 
But reality is neither black or white; it often has many different shades of grey. I see blockchain 
technology as neither the cure nor the curse of today’s political issues. Rather, I see it as a tool that 
could enable us to experiment with new governance structures and alternative political systems – in a 
world where there is very little room left for experimentation.  
Multiple shades of activism 
Digital activism is a not a recent phenomenon. Social movements increasingly leverage the power of 
digital technologies to coordinate themselves and communicate to a broader audience – as illustrated 
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by the role played by social media during the Arab uprisings in 2011.
4
 But the internet also enabled the 
emergence of new communities of kinship, with a variety of online platforms (e.g Facebook, Twitter, 
Whatsapp) gathering people around specific interests or values, regardless of their political views. 
Some of these communities operate as tight social groups, providing members with a newfound sense 
of belonging and a collective identity.
5
 While they do not engage in what we usually regard as political 
activity, these online communities play a key role in shaping the way people organize and coordinate 
themselves, in ways that significantly differ from those of existing political institutions.
6
 Apart from 
the legal regime these communities operate with, they are governed by their own systems of rules and 
social norms – which members voluntary abide by.  
In her book, ‘Social Movements and Their Technologies: Wiring Social Change’, Stefania Milan 
illustrates the different approaches of social movements in materializing their ideas into the world.
7
 
Insiders adopt a cooperative attitude: they recognise existing institutions as a legitimate source of 
power and actively engage in their game, through advocacy and traditional decision-making 
procedures.
8
 Outsiders adopt a more confrontational attitude: they reject the rules of these institutions 
and choose instead to exert pressure from the outside, through campaigns, protest or other form of 
political resistance.
9
 Finally, what she refers to as beyonders are a wholly different bunch. Beyonders 
simply refuse to engage with existing institutions: they do not want to fight them nor do they want to 
change them, they simply regard them as a leftover from a past era – which they are trying to render 
obsolete by building new systems.
10
 Thus, relatively to the other two groups, beyonders operate in a 
way that is more autonomous or independent; they do not play for or against the established political 
system, they just decide to ignore it or bypass it. 
Is it fair to conclude that beyonders do not play a political role in society? Clearly not. By creating 
an alternative to existing institutions, they exert an indirect pressure forcing them to adjust themselves 
to maintain their position. Perhaps more so than insiders and outsiders, who operate within a given 
political framework, beyonders are deeply concerned with social change. Their political action is the 
result of a constructive reaction to the current state of affairs. They are responding to their own needs 
using new schemes and methodologies, leveraging the power of communities to create new 
institutions that will help them fulfil their missions – through what essentially amounts to a new form 
of political organisation. 
Beyond the blockchain 
Today, in the shadow corners of the internet, a new group of beyonders is emerging, looking at 
blockchain technology as a means to replace many of our traditional institutions. While most of the 
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attention was put, initially, on Bitcoin disrupting banks and other financial operators,
11
 as people 
understood the full potential of blockchain technology, they saw it a means to implement new 
governance structures that could potentially replace some of our existing systems of governance.
12
  
At the extreme end of this spectrum are those who envision the creation of new blockchain-based 
virtual nations, with a view to ultimately replace the nation-state. This is the case, for instance, of 
Bitnation: an initiative aimed at creating a new sovereign jurisdiction that operates only and 
exclusively in cyberspace, independently of any geographical boundaries. Founded in 2014, Bitnation 
describes itself as a decentralized borderless voluntary nation that anyone can join or leave as they 
wish:
13
 a transnational community of global citizens that spontaneously coordinate themselves, with 
no recourse to coercion.  
To early internet pioneers, this might sound familiar. Already in 1996, in the ‘Declaration of the 
Independence of Cyberspace’, John Perry Barlow described the digital world as an independent space 
that simply could not be regulated, because – he claimed – governments did not have the right nor the 
capacity to exert their sovereignty over it
14
 (even though history has eventually taught us otherwise). 
Barlow was essentially a beyonder – mocking the various governmental attempts at regulating the 
internet landscape, in ways that he considered to be ineffective in this new digital era. Similarly, 
Bitnation is mostly the result of a beyonders’ approach to governance, trying to create a new sovereign 
nation that ignores the rules and procedures of existing nation-states, regarded as obsolete in this new 
digital world. Because it operates on a transnational and decentralized peer-to-peer network (the 
Ethereum blockchain), Bitnation is not under the control of any one government. Indeed, by relying on 
blockchain technology, Bitnation is creating a system that not only tries to escape from the hegemony 
of nation-states – because it has no single point of failure, or control – but also tries to compete with 
existing institutions and governmental systems – by providing self-sovereign identities, notarization 
services, property rights and company registration, dispute resolution systems, etc. which are usually 
associated with the functions of the public administration. The Ethereum blockchain is particularly 
useful in this context, because – as a public and transnational blockchain – it provides the necessary 
transparency, verifiability, incorruptibility and trust that one would expect from these governmental 
services.  
‘Governance in the real world is so fucked. We have to start thinking about how to build it in the 
virtual world’ said Lawrence Lessig in an interview15, after he resigned from the 2016 presidential 
campaign. While Lessig was referring to the creation of a massive multiplayer online game
16
 inviting 
players to experiment with different forms of governances, it might be worth investigating whether 
initiatives such as Bitnation, and other attempts at creating blockchain-based virtual nations (such as 
Cultu.re) or even blockchain-based virtual worlds (such as Decentraland) could actually provide a 
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new space of experimentation, allowing people to experiment with new political systems that operate 
outside of any defined territory. Indeed, these initiatives – which rely on decentralised blockchain-
based systems – are not located in any given jurisdiction: they subsist in a transnational space, which 
has yet to be colonised by new governance structures and experimental political regimes.  
Blockchain-based virtual nations 
Can these blockchain-based systems support the emergence of a new framework for global citizenship 
(as suggested by Liav Orgad, amongst others
17
) where people pledge allegiance not to an existing 
government or nation-state, but to a global community that transcends national boundaries?
18
 Can they 
support a new understanding citizenship as collective identity, providing new opportunities for 
collective action and civic participation in a post-national world?
19
 As with many things today, the 
answer is not a simple one. The concept of blockchain-based virtual nations is interesting because it is 
highly controversial. It is, in fact, supported by different groups, for very different purposes.  
On the one hand, the concept of a virtual nation is appealing to many libertarians, who see it as an 
opportunity to reduce the room for governmental intervention, by creating new ad-hoc governmental 
structures aimed at creating a society governed by (unregulated) market forces, and nothing else. This 
is the vision brought forward most prominently by Peter Thiel, who envisions the creation of a new 
sovereign nation on an offshore artificial island
20
, built 200 miles off the Californian coast. This vision 
is also shared by a number of crypto-libertarians,
21
 such as the team behind Bitnation, who believe that 
– since we have lost trust in our governments – we shall now rely on blockchain technology to create 
trustless systems (i.e. systems where trust is no longer needed) with a view to support and facilitate a 
series of atomic peer-to-peer interactions in a seemingly stateless environment.
22
 
On the other hand, there are people who see virtual nations as an opportunity to overcome the lack 
of trust in governmental institutions, through the creation of new trusted communities with a global 
scope. These communities can experiment with new institutional structures that operate independently 
from, or as a complement to existing institutions. They can support the emergence of grassroots 
initiatives designed to fill the gaps generated by the progressive shrinking of the welfare state – i.e. the 
provision of public services and shared infrastructure, the pursuit of the common good, and the 
protection of individual and collective rights.
23
 Blockchain technologies could provide new 
mechanisms of social or political coordination, allowing for transnational communities and activist 
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groups (such as human rights defenders, internet freedoms advocates and climate change campaigners) 
to gather around a newfound sense of identity and organise themselves as a collective.  
The idea is not to replace nation-states with new or competing forms of sovereignty, but rather to 
provide new means for global communities to mobilise and experiment with new ways of engaging in 
civic life. If political participation no longer finds its place in the context of traditional governmental 
structures, perhaps these virtual communities – or cloud communities, as Orgad calls them – might be 
able to bring civics back to life. Indeed, if citizenship refers not only to a legal status, but also to an 
individual’s political activity and collective identity,24 we might soon witness the emergence of new 
global citizens, who regard these new virtual nations as polities and self-identify as their members. 
This is the vision supported by initiatives like Democracy Earth and Aragon, two blockchain-based 
platforms providing tools for small and large organisations to operate in a globalised post nation-state 
world, through their own governance rules and dispute resolution systems. Without trying to replace 
the role of the state as a political institution, these initiatives are exploring whether (and how) some of 
the functions undertaken by governmental authorities – e.g. the issuance of identity cards, recordation 
of vital records and maintenance of public registries, etc. – could be transposed into a blockchain-
based system. 
People are thus ideally free to decide, on a case-by-case basis, whether they want to rely on 
traditional institutions and governmental frameworks, or whether they would rather adopt these new 
experimental systems, whose values they might feel more attuned with. As a general rule, citizens 
cannot easily revoke their allegiance to a particular nation-state, because – as highlighted by Rainer 
Bauböck – the social contract described by Hobbes and Rousseau is not a negotiable contractual 
agreement entered into by consent (i.e. citizenship as a legal status is generally something that one 
does not chose and that, once acquired, cannot be easily gotten ridden of). Yet, to the extent possible, 
they could choose to acquire additional citizenships, becoming members of multiple communities 
based on affinity and consent. Insofar as they provide valuable services to their citizens, these virtual 
communities (or virtual nations) may be competing with one another – and potentially with nation-
states – so as to expand their user-base. 
While this might sound speculative at best, we are already seeing glimmers of this world. For 
several years, the republic of Estonia has been trying to create a ‘digital nation for global citizens,’25 as 
illustrated by its e-residency program, which provides a government-issued digital ID to all individuals 
requesting it. Inspired by the notion of government as a platform,
26
 e-Estonia is trying to become the 
hub for every governmental service, providing all of its electronic residents with a secure 
identification system, notarisation services, and even the ability to run a company or open a bank 
account, without ever putting foot into Estonia. With over 28,000 e-residents from all over the world, 
today, the state of Estonia increasingly operates on a digital layer, enabling people to interact with its 
governmental platform independently of their country of citizenship or residency.
27
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Competing sovereignties 
Competition between nation-states, trying to collect new members by providing more efficient or 
reliable governments services, has, therefore, already begun. If Estonia can collect e-residents on a 
global scale – in spite of its national boundaries – what would prevent virtual nations from doing the 
same, without a physical territory? Are we actually moving towards a world in which multiple nations 
are competing to attract more citizens, in the same way as companies are today competing to attract 
more customers?
28
 
Of course, things get murky when we move from purely administrative tasks – like identity, 
property and company recordation – to more political tasks, involving policy and decision-making. If 
people could choose to become citizens only of the communities with whom they agree, they would 
essentially engage in a generalised version of nation-shopping, constantly trying to find the 
jurisdictions that seem the most advantageous for them. When brought to an extreme, this would 
ultimately mean the end of politics. 
Politics is all about compromises, in order to accommodate different viewpoints without entering 
into a conflict. An opt-in or exit-based political system essentially eliminates the notion of politics, 
because it removes the need for compromise. People with different values or opinions would no longer 
need to argue and deliberate in order to reach consensus, because if they’re in disagreement, they can 
simply leave.  
As Bauböck recognises, there are significant challenges in letting people choose which nation they 
want to pledge allegiance to. The state as a sovereign entity – Hobbes’ Leviathan – is not only 
responsible for preserving the public order, it is also in charge of promoting the general interests, 
producing common goods and creating a collective sense of redistribution and justice. All these 
functions could disappear as we move towards a more market-based approach to citizenship.  
I am, however, more pessimistic than Bauböck when it comes to the way nation-states will adapt to 
these technological changes. Given the progressive disengagement of citizens in local politics, and the 
growing distrust in existing institutions – whose legitimacy is increasingly put into question – it might 
not be surprising to see a new wave of nationalism emerging all over the world, with nation-states 
drawing on nationalist and anti-immigration narratives to reinforce their hegemony over the territory, 
essentially redefining on-going relationships between citizens and non-citizens.
29
 
At the same time, due to the increasing trends towards globalisation, large internet corporations, 
like Google or Facebook, are progressively taking on some of the functions that were once specific to 
the nation-state: from the task of supporting the discourses in the public sphere to the role of acting as 
identity providers.
30
 With several billions of users on their platforms, these corporations are slowly 
turning into de facto corporate nations, with their own system of rules that they unilaterally define and 
impose on their ‘citizens’. Traditional nation-states might, therefore, soon have to compete not only 
with virtual nations, but also with these new transnational corporate nations – similar to Neal 
Stephenson’s franchulates as science-fiction fans will certainly point out.31 
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New opportunities for experimentation 
It is in this convoluted (and daunting) context that I see the rise of blockchain-based virtual nations as 
a positive omen. Perhaps the reference to virtual nations is not the most accurate one, because the term 
has a strong political connotation and somewhat gives the impression that these communities are 
assuming the role of traditional nation-states. While some of these communities do intend to replace 
the figure of the nation-state (e.g. Bitnation), others are simply trying to experiment with new and 
allegedly apolitical governance systems,
32
 which nevertheless play a crucial political function.  
Because they rely on voluntary association, virtual communities might well remove the need for 
compromises within a single community, yet they do not eliminate the need for compromise between 
multiple communities. Hence, politics are not gone, they are simply moving into a different layer. By 
aggregating people with similar values and opinions, these virtual communities could in fact 
strengthen the voice of certain minorities – usually stifled by the majority’s opinion – and create a 
more lively debate and political discourse at the outside (rather than on the inside) of these 
communities. As such, they could end up participating in conventional politics, along with other real-
world interests groups.  
To conclude, let me take the stance of a beyonder for a moment. As a member of Creative 
Commons,
33
 I have always been fascinated by its solution. Instead of trying to reform copyright law 
from the inside or fight it from the outside, Creative Commons introduced an alternative legal regime 
for creative works that coexists with the existing regulatory framework (in fact, it is based on it) for 
authors to experiment with new business models that do not rely on the exclusivity and artificial 
scarcity of copyright law.  
Today, with the advent of blockchain technologies, a new wave of innovation is underway in the 
realm of governance. This innovation is one that will benefit everyone: the insiders, i.e. governmental 
authorities like Estonia, relying on blockchain technology to increase the transparency and 
accountability of public administrations; the outsiders, like Peter Thiel, trying to create new self-
sovereign nations with the intention to escape from the laws and control of existing nation-states; and, 
of course, the beyonders, like Bitnation et al., eager to use the technology to support the coordination 
of transnational communities of voluntary association that operate independently of traditional nation-
states, but are capable of peacefully coexisting with them. It is the latter which I am the most excited 
about, and which I believe could contribute to developing new governance models that might help us 
build a real global democracy. 
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Technological advances sometimes alter our experience of well-established notions. The night is as 
dark today as in the 18
th
 century. However streetlights have pierced its veil. The distance between 
Turin and Rome is the same today as it was in the first century AD. Yet what was once at least a 
week-long journey has become with high speed trains a commute of a few hours. Similarly, distributed 
ledgers technology, by making it technically possible for every individual to create and maintain a 
globally recognised digital identity, has the potential to materially alter the experience and the 
meaning of citizenship.
1
 Such technological advances, and their possible applications, make global 
political participation, moral commitment and rights claiming as envisioned by global citizenship 
theorists one touch closer to reality.
2
 Liav Orgad and Rainer Bauböck emphasize from different 
perspectives that new technologies are not meant to supplant citizenship as we know it; they rather add 
to it. The notion of an international legal persona – explains Orgad – is a complement to national 
citizenship. And cloud political communities are – in Bauböck’s view – an extension of existing 
political communities. Hence, global citizenship comes to flank long-established notions of 
citizenship.  
I agree with them on the complementary nature of global citizenship in respect to traditional one. 
And in this contribution I focus on the latter rather than on the former. I propose to consider how the 
prospect of technology-enabled global citizenship alters the concept, legal structure and scope of 
citizenship as we know it. The possibility of novel virtual frontiers challenges further traditional 
citizenship as a state-based, non-voluntary and bounded membership. A web of relations beyond the 
bilateral one between state and individual comes within the purview of the concept; consensual 
citizenship acquires a new role; and citizenship becomes increasingly unbounded from national 
borders.  
A network model of citizenship 
Cloud communities can cause a conceptual shift as they strike at the heart of the role of states in 
shaping citizenship. As Bauböck observes, global citizenship cannot push the state out of business. 
States remain responsible for providing a range of fundamental services and benefits. Yet the advent 
of distributed ledgers technology potentially breaks the state’s monopoly in attributing and 
authenticating citizens’ identities.3 This nuances in turn the state’s role as the main counterpart of the 
citizen. Citizenship no longer focuses on a binary relation between lord and vassal, sovereign and 
subject, state and individual. While that relation loses part of its feudalist character, to echo Orgad, 
citizenship comes to express a relation between different classes of ‘belongers’ to a legal and political 
community: the birthright members, the voluntary joiners, the reluctant leavers, the engaged passers-
by, to mention just a few. Blockchain and other technologies will mean that their interactions are no 
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longer exclusively mediated by the state and its rules. They would rather articulate through a web of 
virtual relations enabled by encrypted and self-governed digital identities.  
A network model of citizenship pushes us to rethink, and possibly reframe, the legal structure and 
scope of citizenship as we know it. First, consent potentially gains a heftier role than it has 
traditionally played in the domain of citizenship. Second, cross-border citizenship receives a new lease 
of life. 
More room for consensual citizenship 
Consensual citizenship is traditionally the exception rather than the rule. The vast majority of humans 
are attributed a citizenship through a birthright lottery.
4
 A tiny minority exercises consent to change 
citizenship through processes of naturalisation,
5
 or renounces a citizenship automatically received. 
And consent is still only exercised within the narrow tracks designed by states for attribution and 
removal of citizenship. But otherwise citizenship is the legacy of blood relations or territorial 
connections one has never chosen.  
With technology enabling participation of virtual citizens in cloud communities, the relative weight 
of consensual citizenship potentially changes. This is because participation in a cloud community 
could allow citizens to virtually vote with their feet.
6
 It would enable everyone to decide to spend their 
digital identity in a community other than the territorial one to which one is assigned at birth. With the 
opening up of opportunities for virtual exit from the cage of territorial citizenship, the negotiating 
balance in the relation between state and individual changes. The question ‘why am I a citizen of this 
nation state’ no longer finds an obvious answer and individual citizens gain more clout against the 
states to which they automatically belong. On the one hand, this transformation may lead to rethink the 
opportunities for birthright members to confirm or withdraw their consent to membership.
7
 On the 
other hand, it may result in states pushing their efforts to attract consenting passers-by into the ranks of 
their territorial citizenry, as they already do in part with investor citizenship programs.
8
  
More room for consensual citizenship is not necessarily good news, as Bauböck observes. There 
are risks linked to consent. Bauböck sees the non-voluntary character of citizenship as a condition for 
preserving democracy: non-voluntary determination of citizenship is the only guarantee that political 
communities, whether territorial or virtual, preserve a healthy level of diversity. A further risk is that 
consensual cloud communities are resorted to as a means to harden the link between citizenship and 
territory rather than to loosen it. Cloud communities may easily become a tool for amplifying cultural 
traditions and national sentiments. They offer a platform for joining virtually different territorial 
pockets of supporters of closure and exclusion. From this perspective cloud communities risk to widen 
the gap between the mobile and globally oriented citizens on the one hand, and the immobile ones on 
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the other hand, as Bauböck points out.
9
 Should this cleavage come to inform the competition among 
virtual nations that Primavera De Filippi envisions, global society could end up split between the 
virtual communities of those engaged across borders and the ones of those living in splendid isolation.  
But technology-enabled global citizenship does not only nudge states gently towards consensual 
citizenship. It also enhances qualitatively the prospects of cross-border citizenship. Enhanced cross-
border citizenship may hold the key to the bridge across the above referred gap between the mobiles 
and immobiles.  
A citizen’s stake beyond national borders 
It goes without saying that digital identities and their applications multiply the opportunities for long-
distance citizenship. They can help states to engage their diasporas through virtual communities. Or 
enable expats to receive benefits and services issued by their state of origin in a state of residence. In 
this sense, technology supports and complements the legal infrastructure underpinning cross-border 
movement and transnational citizenship.
10
 
Beyond this, cloud communities of digitally identified participants have the potential to alter the 
very nature of cross-border citizenship. They open up opportunities for extending the reach of 
citizenship beyond the national territory even without cross-border movement. Cloud communities 
indeed offer to individuals the option to raise their voice, or claim benefits and services, in territorial 
communities to which they do not physically belong. States can open their communities to new classes 
of e-citizens along the lines of Estonia’s e-residence program.11 And sedentary citizens could negotiate 
virtual membership in states to which they will never travel.  
In this sense, digital identities and cloud communities may create the right to have, and exercise, a 
stake in legal and political communities beyond the borders of one’s own nation.12 On a practical 
level, they enable states to recognise forms of ad hoc political citizenship and temporary virtual 
admission to accommodate the stakes of non-citizens. Relevant non-citizens could be given voice in 
selected deliberations of the territorial political community, touching upon the interests of a larger 
cohort of virtual denizens. On a conceptual level, the right that technology enables, if adequately 
recognized and framed within the legal structure of national citizenship, could fundamentally alter the 
scope of traditional citizenship. It would no longer be just the right to have rights, and raise a voice, 
within a bounded national territory but the right to have rights and to participate wherever interests, 
careers, affective life, chance or just curiosity bring one’s stakes. 
In a similar scenario, the counterpart of the citizen would no longer be just one state (or two in the 
case of dual nationals), but potentially the plurality of states within whose territorial boundaries a 
person’s virtual interests unfold in the course of a lifetime. ‘Why should states even bother to open 
their virtual borders to such virtual denizens?’, one could wonder. In part, because a state’s citizens 
would reciprocally benefit from the same opportunity in other states. Hence a state would 
accommodate virtual denizens to protect the interests of its own citizens. Further, states may have an 
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economic, or even political interest, in activating the stakes of some external e-citizens. Relevant 
citizens may contribute capital or economic initiative. Or they may support governmental policy 
choices.  
Global citizenship for the stay-at-homes 
The citizen’s right to have a stake beyond national borders potentially bridges the cleavage between 
the globally mobile and the immobile. It belongs to, and appeals to the interests of, both classes of 
citizens. It can be exercised physically by the former group, and virtually by the latter through the 
novel channels that technology opens up. It is this very right that holds the potential to respond to 
nationalist and protectionist stances variedly represented in the contemporary political spectrum of 
several western countries. To the extent that these stances are driven by fear and insecurity, the 
concrete conferral of a right to have a stake beyond one’s borders can teach the 21st century citizens an 
important lesson: that protection and security do not come from populist retrenchment into closure and 
exclusion. They rather come from the broadening of the umbrella under which citizenship claims can 
find accommodation.  
As the night has become less dark and millenary cities have grown closer, also national citizenship 
can change to track not only the territorial boundaries of nation states but also the virtual ones of 
human stakes and interests. Never mind the gap between the mobiles and the immobiles. New 
technology brings about the gift of global citizenship for the stay-at-homes.  
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A World Without Law; A World Without Politics 
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I have read with great interest the stimulating contributions of Liav Orgad, Rainer Bauböck, Primavera 
De Filippi, and Francesca Strumia. It is important to ask how a universal internet will affect the nature 
of citizenship, the status of which has heretofore been dominated by territorially-defined nation states. 
I confess, however, that I know nothing about blockchain technology. So I accept Orgad’s assertion 
that blockchain technology ‘can provide people with self-sovereign identity – they are the ones who 
create and register their identity and they are the only ones who control what to do with it and with 
whom to share what.’ I accept that nation states can off-load this identification function to some 
technological mechanism. 
But Orgad seems to believe that this mechanism creates the possibility of ‘realizing one of the most 
morally-desirable notions in human history – global citizenship without a world state.’ This is because 
the mechanism potentially shatters a Westphalian system in which legal personality is conferred by 
nation states.  
Orgad writes that ‘the concept of an international legal persona will enable individuals to establish 
“Cloud Communities” of different kinds. Conceptually, cloud communities have traditional 
characteristics of political communities, but not necessarily a physical territory. The communal bond 
can be global in nature – such as a shared concern about climate change, ageing, veganism and animal 
rights (i.e., a universal community, open to everyone) – or ascriptive, such as a Jewish / Bahá’í faith / 
Diasporic Cloud Nations, a form of “transnational nationalism” (i.e., a selective community, open only 
to certain members). It can be thematic or geographic – region, country, state, city, village – based on 
a shared interest or territorial identity, even if not or legally recognised communities. Membership is 
based on consent; a person can be a member of several communities or none.’ 
So described, cloud communities are, as Rainer Bauböck properly observes, ‘an expansion of civil 
society.’ It is a far jump from expanding international civil society to creating global citizenship. A 
global citizen must be a member of a global political community. Orgad acknowledges this point. He 
states that his ‘focus is political communities.Cloud communities are not social networks, but political 
communities whose aim is political decision-making and in which individuals take part in a process of 
governance and the creation of law.’ 
It is at precisely this point that I lose track of the argument. Orgad is correct to observe that the 
defining characteristic of political communities is the production of ‘governance and the creation of 
law.’ What I do not understand is how cloud communities produce governance and law.  
By imposing sanctions of expulsion, any given cloud community can govern itself; it can create its 
own law. But this is true for every group within civil society. Every church has its rules and its criteria 
for excommunication. The point about a political community, however, is that it imposes law upon 
those who, as Bauböck observes, are not voluntarily members. Political communities govern all those 
within their jurisdiction. That is precisely the difference between political communities and a private 
organization. It is why law ultimately must have recourse to force, even to violence (as Max Weber 
observes).  
A world in which every community is voluntary is a world in which every norm is also voluntary. 
It is therefore a world without law. Because politics is the social form by which we create law, it is 
also a world without politics.  
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If I commit murder, the necessity of my punishment is not bounded by my consent. Cloud 
communities, which are defined by consent, are thus irrelevant. The question is who we will entrust 
with the fearsome power of involuntary punishment, which is not a purely textual, purely mediated 
consequence. To the extent that punishment operates on the body of the guilty, it cannot be within the 
purview of cloud communities. 
De Filippi shrewdly observes that the attraction of blockchain technologies is to create ‘trustless 
systems (i.e. system where trust is no longer needed).’ The hope that technology will remove the 
human element is an old one. We all long to leave behind the flesh and live only in the spirit. But this 
is merely a fantasy. There is always corruption, and for that reason we can never escape the need for 
politics, police, and law.  
Suppose someone infiltrates the blockchain and manipulates it for nefarious ends. To whom will 
we entrust the power of ensuring the integrity of the chain? And don’t think that it can never happen. It 
always happens. All technology is ultimately wielded by human hands that can become dirty. Who 
will have the power (to use an old-fashioned word) to cleanse the chain and restore the system? And 
how will that power be legitimised? How will we come to trust that power?  
Politics is what we use in the face of such problems, when we must confront each other as distinct 
human beings and reach accommodation about essential matters in which we differ. Another way of 
seeing this point is this: If cloud communities create, as Strumia writes, ‘citizens’ who can ‘virtually 
vote with their feet,’ who will protect global citizens as they travel between cloud communities?  
At their best, cloud communities can inspire all the virtues that de Tocqueville saw in civil 
associations. They can train us in the benefits of participation and sociality. But in the contributions of 
Strumia and Orgad, I sense also another value, that of free, autonomous, marketplace consumers. 
Orgad writes that e-Estonia ‘resembles a business model where states are service providers and 
“citizens” are billed for the service.’ Strumia imagines e-states that provide services to expats or 
‘virtual denizens.’  
Strumia and Orgad emphasise real and important developments. But it is a mistake to confuse these 
possibilities with the creation of political communities. Strumia and Orgad are instead describing 
ordinary marketplace consumer transactions. If states can sell services cheaper than a private entity, 
and if they can sell these services internationally, that may be all to the good.  
But what does this have to do with law and governance? To answer this query, we need to ask 
questions like: Who can (involuntarily) tax virtual denizens? Who can determine the commercial law 
that will govern the market transactions that a state conducts with virtual denizens? and so forth. Every 
market transaction presupposes a legal environment that is outside the transaction itself. Setting the 
requirements of that environment is a political task. 
It is quite true that traditional states can offload services that now we associate with 
governmentality. Perhaps states can offload the determination of identity status to a blockchain. As the 
EU has taught us, it is a mistake to confuse government sovereignty with the particular shape in which 
it is presently exercised. But insofar as we wish to deploy government sovereignty – insofar as we 
wish to exercise state functions backed by the force of law – it is fearsome and unstable thing to do so 
without a corresponding political community, as the EU has also taught us.  
If the very definition of cloud communities is that they are voluntary and exist only at the whim 
and interest of members, I do not see how blockchain cloud communities promise the creation of 
global citizenship. They seem instead to signal the emergence of global civil society or at most a 
global market in government services. And to the extent that cloud communities are involuntary, then 
I must ask how their members are conscripted and governed. And I must also ask how blockchains or 
any other technological device can offer hope that such governance will be more just or more 
democratic than what presently exists in traditional territorially-bounded nation states. 
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The creation of novel forms of information technology will put pressure on traditional forms of state 
sovereignty. The future, then, will be unlike the past. That much – to me, at least – seems beyond 
question. The more interesting subject, though, is whether we will be able to predict – from where and 
when we now are, with the technologies and histories we now inhabit – what that future will look like. 
Liav Orgad, in his lead essay, offers us a compelling – and profoundly optimistic – vision of one 
possible future. In that future, our current world of sovereignty, in which human rights are nested in 
territorially limited sovereign states, is supplemented by a pluralistic and polycentric network of 
voluntary communities, mediated by information technology based upon self-sovereign forms of 
digital identity. The notion of global citizenship, in that world, might move from useful metaphor to 
lived reality; we could, at last, inhabit a world of our own choosing – a world in which, as Francesca 
Strumia adds, we might join new worlds while never leaving home. 
It is my lot, in these debates, to provide reasons to worry. I want to highlight and describe problems 
that stand in the way of moving from where we are now to where Orgad thinks we might soon be. I 
want to present these worries, not as permanent obstacles to the forms of life Orgad describes, but as 
problems we would have to solve before that world could be made real. The worries I describe stem 
from features of the state system that I think are poorly replicated in the world of cloud community 
and voluntary association; territorial states right now provide us with goods that cannot be provided by 
even the best systems of informational technology. To denigrate the importance of territorial states, in 
favour of these voluntaristic forms of association, might make things worse, rather than better.  
I follow the lead of Rainer Bauböck, who notes the ways in which diversity of thought might be 
placed at risk in voluntary association, and Robert Post, who argues that the power of the state to 
punish cannot be replicated by a virtual and voluntary community. My own challenge is broader: the 
protection of human rights, I believe, can only be accomplished by means of violence and force, in 
both policing and in punishment – and this violence is in our world reserved (as a matter of right, if 
not reality) for use by states. Orgad’s polycentric vision, in other words, must either acknowledge the 
continued relevance of the state system, and provide space for the preservation and maintenance of 
that system – or it must provide us with the resources to move beyond that system, by showing how 
violence might be rightly used by dispersed forms of intentional community. What I think cannot be 
done – or, at any rate, cannot be done easily – is to insist that informational technology has 
fundamentally transformed political reality, in the world in which we live. It might do so, of course; 
but I do not think it has done so yet – and there is a great deal of work to do, for philosophers and 
politicians alike, before that transformed world is open to us.  
To see this, we might begin by looking at the notion of a failed state. What does such a state look 
like? A failed state, in the first instance, involves the absence of a political community sufficient to 
provide the means of survival; food, shelter, water, and so on.
1
 But the state rarely actually provides 
these goods itself; we do not expect the government to actually deliver us food and water, unless 
circumstances (or that government) have become very dire. What the state provides, instead, is 
coercion – coercion directed, in the first instance, at those people who would steal our food or water; 
at people who would break contracts with us as regards our labour; and so on. A state fails when it 
fails to provide the coercive means needed to preserve these liberties – or, on a broader vision of 
failure, when it sometimes provides the means of survival, and sometimes refrains from doing so.
2
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This is, to be sure, a minimal account of what a state must do; but it is already instructive. We 
should note, to begin with, that the use of coercion by the state is not here an optional part of its 
toolkit; coercion – which is to say, violence – is required of any state that is doing the job of the state. 
The second thing to note is that a great deal of political philosophy amounts to understanding what 
particular forms of violence might be justified specifically to the people gathered together within the 
coercive grasp of the state.
3
 Most of us, after all, regard the state as having a duty to do more than 
avoid failure; it has to be just in how it deploys these coercive powers that make it distinct. The state 
must, therefore, do justice to those people over whom it claims the power of rightful coercion. The 
final thing to note is that the state is supposed to be capable of offering, in any particular dispute about 
what justice demands, something very much like finality. Once the state has decided some matter of 
controversy, it is entitled to insist that its determination shall be non-optional for the political 
community over which it rules.
4
  
Why, though, is any of this relevant to our discussion of blockchain and cloud community? It is 
relevant, I think, because of how our most important rights are linked to the state’s use of violence. 
Our human rights are conceptually linked to violence; Hannah Arendt’s often-cited ‘right to have 
rights’ demands the existence of an agency that will deploy force against those who would presume to 
deny or trespass on those rights.
5
 Our civil rights, too, are conceptually linked with violence; the 
reason I have the right to vote in the United States and not France, goes the argument, is that the law 
of the United States – and not France – gets to order me around, and to coerce me if I resist. This sort 
of coercion, though, is unavailable to even the most robust and well-developed forms of virtual 
association. We have, I think, very little sense of what it would be for them to have such coercive 
rights; and we have some good reason to worry that a world in which they had such rights might be a 
bad one indeed. 
We can use these thoughts to develop some more specific worries about the examples used by 
Orgad in his essay. Take the notion of political participation in a virtual political community. Orgad 
suggests that such communities would form valuable spaces for political negotiation. I agree – so long 
as we are aware that such communities are political in only a secondary and derivative sense. The 
political community of the United States must engage in discourse whose aim is to determine what 
sorts of things the law of the United States shall do. This sort of political community is, I think, 
political in a primary sense; if the discourse were to stop, the justice of coercive law in the United 
States would necessarily cease. Other forms of political association, though, are political communities 
only in a secondary sense. If they were to cease their discussions, the world of discourse would likely 
be impoverished; but the justice of United States legal determinations, for example, would not be 
automatically placed into doubt. I think we might usefully call the United States’ citizenry, and 
Amnesty International, political associations; certainly, they both seem associative, and they both 
seem political. But the two are distinct in how they relate to violence. The United States uses violence. 
Amnesty International offers criticism about how that violence is used. The latter sort of political 
community, in short, could not even in principle replace the former. It might make the political 
deliberations in the former more robust, and more likely to do justice. (Certainly, a world without 
Amnesty International would likely have worse states in it than our own world.) But the virtual 
political community cannot do the job of the state’s political community. The fact that we can use the 
phrasing of political community in both contexts should not obscure the vast differences between the 
two sorts of human association. 
I would suggest that something similar might be felt about blockchain cryptography, which 
produces self-sovereign forms of identification. These forms of identification are sovereign, in that 
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they are initiated with and controllable by the individual; but the individual has no greater sovereignty, 
in the sense used in international law, after her digital ID than before it. What the digital ID would 
provide, after all, is information. Information, we say, is power; but so too is, well, power, in the 
ordinary sense in which states use military might to preserve their sovereignty. What is required for 
rights to be protected, following on our discussion above, is a set of powerful agents willing to deploy 
violence against those who would do violence against us. The digital ID might be used to frustrate 
some forms of malignant state action – and, of course, allow others. What it cannot do is provide the 
violence that is conceptually linked with our human rights. If one is not possessed of a state willing 
and able to use violence on one’s behalf prior to the digital ID, one is not provided with one once that 
ID is created.  
I suspect similar things might be said of the Estonian experiment. People have long been able to 
engage in contracts with foreign companies, and foreign states, for particular ends; we engage in 
international trade, we accept particular patterns of dispute resolution, we agree to the terms limiting 
our rights as foreign visitors, and so on. It is not clear what, in particular, changes with the creation of 
a computer system capable of centralising and administering our dealings with a foreign state. I am 
open to being convinced otherwise, but my initial reaction is that registering as an e-Estonian no more 
makes me Estonian than changing planes at Heathrow makes me British. The Estonian state has 
obligations to its own citizens that it does not – or, at least, does not yet – have to me. So long as the e-
Estonian system leaves that fact fundamentally unchanged, it is not clear to me that the virtual 
association it creates is even a pale shadow of a genuine political community.  
All this, I should repeat, is intended not to defeat Orgad’s vision, but to outline what I take to be 
significant worries about how we might make that vision real. Orgad does not want these voluntary 
forms of transnational institution to take the place of states, but insists upon their validity and power as 
‘state-like entities.’ It is this latter point with which I take issue. If these institutions are to become 
genuinely state-like, they must have some part in doing what it is that states do; and we must 
understand how they could do that sort of thing, and how we could move from where we are to where 
we might be. If, in contrast, these institutions are merely places for debate and for the creation of 
solidarity, then we have had them for a very long time indeed; Amnesty International has been helped 
by the digital revolution, but had a life prior to that revolution. It is not clear what these tools provide 
us with except for scale and ease. Either way, I suggest, we have some work to do. Orgad is, I believe, 
well-positioned to help with this work; as I noted at the beginning, his vision is profoundly hopeful, 
while my own is not, and I genuinely hope I can be proven wrong. 
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A World Wide Web of Citizenship 
Peter J. Spiro
* 
Liav Orgad offers a characteristically insightful and provocative speculation on how novel 
technologies will facilitate global citizenship. Global interconnectedness is transforming individual 
identity composites to include transnational elements, and the migration of identity is, as Orgad 
argues, establishing more pervasive understandings of global responsibility. Along these three 
dimensions of interconnectedness, identity, and responsibility, we are assimilating an understanding of 
global citizenship. A recent worldwide poll
1
 found that a majority of respondents consider themselves 
more global citizens than citizens of their own countries.  
Orgad is also to be congratulated for identifying the citizenship-related possibilities of blockchain 
technologies, which might further enable that sense of global identity. Blockchain could deliver a 
formal identity detached from national citizenship and sovereign control. Indeed, a blockchain identity 
could plausibly displace the passport as the standard form of identification in the same way that 
Bitcoin might plausibly displace national currencies. So long as it were insulated from the surveillance 
capacities of states and powerful non-state actors, a blockchain ID might enhance individual 
autonomies on a global landscape. 
I am less taken by the concept of cloud communities as such. The internet facilitates the making of 
transnational and non-state communities, but for the most part these are communities that exist on the 
ground. Eliminating friction in long-distance global communication, the web enables connectedness 
among individuals who might otherwise maintain only thin or even non-existent ties. This is the case 
with almost all real-space identities that are not based on territorial location. The Web collapses 
location, allowing territorially dispersed communities to establish dense networks.  
True, some communities exist only or primarily on the web. The community of video gamers, for 
example, is mostly an online identity, constituting (perhaps) a genuine cloud community. But even as 
our online selves become more prominent in our everyday lives, they are now and will be for the 
foreseeable future only a slice of our identity composites. (Remember Second Life?) There is also the 
interesting phenomenon of e-residence as innovated by Estonia. But that ‘residence’ doesn’t represent 
community, even in its virtual sense; really, the label is misplaced. No sense of solidarity is likely to 
flow from e-citizenship in that form any more than individuals with bank accounts in the Cayman 
Islands compose a community on that basis. It’s a market convenience and little more.  
The false dichotomies of political community 
Of course, one way in which the web facilitates communities is as a vehicle for community self-
governance and in turn, global self-governance. Almost all communities are political. In this respect, I 
would part ways with the dichotomization of political, state-based communities and civil society that 
appears in other contributions to this forum (Rainer Bauböck’s and Robert Post’s in particular). At the 
very least, it is a continuum rather than a binary. The web will as a general matter enhance 
transparency. The web allows voices to be heard. No organisation, community, identity group, or 
movement can be governed in an insulated, top-down fashion. 
So the web (more so than cloud communities as such) is already enhancing self-governance. It will 
not solve the problem of unequal representation. As Orgad notes, the international system continues 
                                                     
 
* Temple University 
1
 ‘Identity 2016: “Global citizenship” rising, poll suggests’, BBC News, 28 April 2016, available at 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-36139904 
Peter J. Spiro 
30 Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies Working Papers 
formally to work from the principle of sovereign, not individual, equality, so that the citizen of San 
Marino has much greater clout than the citizen of China, both countries having one vote in 
international institutions but San Marino having many fewer citizens deciding how that vote will be 
cast. It’s an extreme departure from the one person, one vote benchmark of democratic governance. 
But sovereign equality masks vast power disparities that in many pairings will more than compensate 
for inequality at the level of the individual. The citizen of China may be one of almost one and a half 
billion, the citizen of San Marino, one of thirty thousand, but China’s global heft surely gives its 
citizens a more powerful voice (however measured) than those of its pipsqueak counterpart.  
The web does help level the playing field against state power generally. In that sense the web may 
mitigate political inequality. Global governance is not the sole preserve of state representatives, as 
Orgad appears to have it; non-state communities are exercising increasing powers, formal or not, at the 
international level. The web supplies an important channel of global influence that does not 
institutionally favour state-based communities (it may even disadvantage them, insofar as bureaucracy 
inhibits technological adaptation). That translates into greater global self-governance capacities, and a 
redistribution of power away from states. The citizen of San Marino who is an environmentalist, who 
has an LGBTQ identification, or for that matter is a Catholic has alternate vehicles of representation at 
the global level, and those vehicles are empowered by the revolution in global communications.  
But inequalities will persist, even if they are redistributed. I agree with Bauböck that Orgad’s 
implication of a world federalism based on blockchain equality present an improbable prospect. In this 
respect, the technology does not answer standing objections to one-person, one-vote at the global 
level. Cloud communities, such as they exist, will themselves operate on the basis of internal formal 
equality in limited contexts only.  
Corroded Leviathan 
The corrosion of state power, meanwhile, will accelerate. Francesca Strumia articulates a new 
question, ‘why am I a citizen of this nation-state?’ That question has new salience, most dramatically 
with the rise of investor and other forms of instrumental citizenship. But it also begs the question, 
‘why should I care that I am a citizen of this (or that) nation-state?’ It is no doubt true that possessing a 
premium passport expands life opportunities.
2
 But within the universe of developed states, the 
question is not so obviously answered. There are inevitable spatial elements to our physical existence 
that are best governed through territorially delimited community, but those necessities need not be 
addressed at the level of the state. Many are better addressed at the subnational level, with respect to 
which ‘voting with your feet’ is practicable as a preference-sorting mechanism into ‘like-minded sets’, 
in Bauböck’s formulation. 
This gives the lie to the other misplaced critique of cloud communities, that they are voluntary and 
monolithic where states are involuntary and diverse. Here again, a descriptive spectrum is more 
appropriate than an artificial binary. It is true of course that most individuals are born into the states of 
which they will remain members (at the same time that a growing number change nationality after 
birth). But many are effectively born into non-state communities as well. Religion supplies an obvious 
example. In some contexts, the exit costs – perhaps a better metric than voluntariness – of leaving a 
religious community
3
 are higher than leaving a state-based one. Communities based on race, ethnicity, 
and sexual orientation are more or less involuntary. They can also be remarkably diverse, sometimes 
more so than state-based communities. The Catholic Church represents a more diverse constituency 
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than does Austria, for example, and its internal dynamics surely implicate politics in any but the most 
formalistic definition of the term.  
I understand the liberal nationalist tendency to lament the corrosion of state-based communities. 
There was a time (the latter half of the twentieth century) when the state impressively if imperfectly 
delivered on redistributionist solidarities. But wishing a return to that era is starting to look somewhat 
sentimental. States are powerful beasts, as Bauböck observes. They will linger in the way of other 
once-dominant legacy institutions (think the Holy Roman Empire). But they are clearly in crisis, and it 
seems unlikely that we will be able to re-right the ship to its formerly commendable course. 
In the meantime, we should be setting our sights on making the new world a better one than it 
might otherwise be. They are many dystopian possibilities (some of them almost apocalyptic) if the 
state collapses and other locations of power replace it. Wishing the resurrection of the state will do us 
no good to the extent that the state can’t withstand material developments on the ground. A necessary 
first step will be to map the new institutional landscape, of which cloud communities will clearly be a 
part. 
 33 
Citizenship Forecast: Partly Cloudy with Chances of Algorithms 
Costica Dumbrava
*
 
In his thought-provoking kick-off contribution, Liav Orgad enthusiastically embraces the idea of a 
global digital citizenship that could remedy some of the deficiencies of the present system of territorial 
national citizenships and, potentially, transform the meaning of democratic citizenship. Technologies 
such as blockchain could allow people to create virtual communities based on shared interests and 
sustained by instantaneous consent, beyond the reach of nosy governments and regardless of national 
borders. By widening access to rights, expanding political voice and creating more secure and diverse 
identities, digital citizenship could address current challenges related to the imperfect attribution of 
status and rights (statelessness, disenfranchisement), widespread political apathy among citizens and 
artificial divisions created by national borders. To paraphrase the text of a famous cartoon: ‘on the 
internet nobody knows you are a foreigner’. 
Other contributors to this forum have pointed out several important tensions and dangers lurking in 
Orgad’s proposal. Rainer Bauböck worries that replacing political communities, which are based 
largely on ascribed but equal citizenship, with freely chosen cloud communities would be ‘fatal for 
democracy’. Purely consensual political communities cannot work because political associations need 
coercive systems capable to enforce laws. As ‘exit-based conflict resolution systems’ (Primavera De 
Filippi), virtual communities are too volatile to ensure stable membership and commitment to rules. 
They are also ill equipped to do the policing and punishing required by political organisation (Robert 
Post, Michael Blake). Orgad’s cloud communities could be seen instead as akin to civil society 
organisations. As novel forms of coagulating solidarity, interests and identities, they can be 
instrumental for checking, challenging or complementing governments, but they have neither the 
means, nor the legitimacy to replace democratic citizenship. 
I agree that technologies may offer surprising opportunities for improving and reimagining our 
social and political life (Francesca Strumia, Peter Spiro). Information and communication technologies 
already offer to some people better access to legal status (digital IDs), allowing them to participate 
more effectively in political deliberations and decision making (e-forums, e-voting), to mobilise 
against authoritarian regimes (twitter revolutions) and to transcend borders in order to engage with 
communities of origin (diaspora politics).
1
 Using powerful computers, myriads of sensors and 
sophisticated algorithms, ‘smart cities’ can identify and address public issues and concerns, such as 
traffic congestions and security threats. However, I worry that we too often take technologies for 
granted and fail to discern between technological opportunity and mythology. 
My contribution to this debate is to raise two general points about the risks involved by linking 
citizenship to technology, namely making citizenship vulnerable to biases and failures that typically 
affect technology and increasing citizenship’s dependence on technology.  
Technologies are not neutral. They are embedded in and tend to reinforce certain values, norms and 
expectations to the detriment of others. For example, predictive algorithms used by police are more 
likely to identify black persons as suspects of crime
2
 and facial recognition software seems to 
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recognise better white male faces.
3
 When they are not biased by design, smart technologies may 
quickly pick up biases from their surroundings. In 2016, Microsoft created Tay, a chatbot that used 
machine learning to emulate a teenage user on Twitter. However, after a few hours of ‘learning’ on the 
social media platform Tay began posting Hitler-praising and other racist and sexist remarks
4
, which 
forced Microsoft to shut it down with an apology. Bitcoin, the most well-known blockchain 
technology, can also be regarded as deeply political, a product of particular ‘right-wing, liberation, 
anti-government politics.’5 Such ideological bias makes blockchain unsuitable for becoming the 
repository of democratic citizenship. If the platform itself is biased towards a particular conception of 
the good, how can we expect it to serve as an arena and mediator between different conceptions of the 
good? 
Technologies often fall short of expectations and are usually hijacked, if not initiated, by 
authoritarian governments and powerful groups. For example, India’s population biometric database, 
Aadhaar, which is intended to provide more than a billion people with digital identities and access to 
public services, has been criticised for its rigidity and security problems, which affect particularly the 
poor.
6
 The Chinese government is currently toying with a Social Credit System
7
 designed to measure 
citizens’ trustworthiness that would further mould their behaviour to align it with the government’s 
priorities and ideology. Blockchain gurus and their followers claim that this technology is highly 
secure. However, this has not prevented a hacker to steal about 60 million USD - worth Ether (another 
major cryptocurrency) in the so-called DAO attack.
8
 Indicative of the ideological underpinning of the 
blockchain movement, and deeply troubling from many perspectives of social justice, is that some 
members of the cryptocurrency community suggested that the attacker should keep the money as s/he 
did not break the rules but simply exploited a flaw in the system. 
As other products of digital technologies, the blockchain exists in online clouds that depend on 
critical physical infrastructures. Online clouds are no less fragile than on-the-sky clouds. Online 
systems are emanations of a bunch of machines connected to various grids that require an awful lot of 
things, such as electricity, computers, data centres, internet servers, etc. Since this enabling 
infrastructure is vulnerable to hacking and shutdown, so is democratic citizenship if embedded in 
digital technologies. If digital identities could be compromised (as in the Indian case) and 
cryptocurrency stolen there is little assurance that digital citizenship solutions, such as universal IDs, 
e-voting systems and blockchain-based cloud communities, would not succumb to the same illness. 
My second point is about the risk of making citizenship (too) dependent on technology. As we 
regularly worry about our children’s addiction to tablets, online gaming and other technologies that 
could affect their social development, we should also worry about our society’s dependence on 
technologies that might affect its capacity for self-government. It is not only about a technologically 
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mediated withdrawal of citizens from the physical public space, á la Putnam,
9
 but also about the 
dangers of making democratic citizenship dependent on specific technological systems and artefacts.  
Exercising citizenship has always involved some forms of technology, from voting pebbles in 
Ancient Greece to ballot boxes and electoral districting algorithms
10
 in modern representative 
democracies. However, the high levels of sophistication and, ultimately, opaqueness of technologies 
such as blockchain must be a real concern should we decide to entrust these technologies with the role 
of embodying democratic self-government. We are asked to take for granted the promises of new 
digital technologies and are kindly invited to take our places in shiny new cloud communities. 
However, we rarely understand how these technologies work, who designs and oversees them and 
whether we would be able to dispense of them if we find them wanting. 
Some religions tell you that the true God is in the clouds; tech enthusiasts tell you that the true 
community is in the cloud. I recommend examining the sky carefully before you start packing. 
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The contributions on cloud communities and citizenship in this blog raise both hopes and fears. The 
reality of an idea initially as outlandish as citizens of a digital cloud is materialising as we ponder and 
debate its practices. Political theory and the law must attempt to keep up with these rapidly changing 
circumstances. This comment raises some questions regarding three assumptions in this debate: 
1. Cloud states1 have no territory 
2. Cloud states cannot exert violence 
3. Cloud state membership is based on choice 
To illustrate and perhaps formulate a response to these assumptions, it might benefit this futuristic 
debate to consult experiences from the past. As suggested by the other contributors, the current 
transformation of the state as a consequence of the ‘digital revolution’ is profound. Nothing less than a 
separation of the state from its traditional connectedness to territory is suggested. The historic event 
that comes close to matching such a seismic shift in the structure of the state was the American and 
French Revolutions, which set in motion the institutional untying of state and church. A historical 
parallel is quickly drawn: if these revolutions led to the separation of Church and State that resulted in 
secular states, will the digital revolution lead to the separation of Territory and State that results in 
cloud states?  
Assumption 1: Cloud states have no territory 
Robert Post, focusing on legislation in his blog post, argues: ‘A world in which every community is 
voluntary is a world in which every norm is also voluntary. It is therefore a world without law. 
Because politics is the social form by which we create law, it is also a world without politics.’ 
For Post, a cloud state, which does not impose legislation, is not a state at all. One can imagine that 
arguments sounding very similar were once raised by opponents of the separation of Church and State: 
‘a secular, neutral state, which does not impose public morals, is not a state at all.’ I raise this parallel 
not to disagree with Post. Rather, it is to show that after centuries of debate on secularism we have 
come to understand that ‘neutrality’ of the state is an impossibility; a state always makes choices that 
impact a state’s public sphere. That is to say that the opponents of the separation of Church and State 
were wrong in the first place because the starting premise of their critique, that the secular state would 
be neutral, was incorrect.  
The starting premise of the cloud state is that it is nonterritorial. Now that we have come to know 
that ‘neutrality’ does not really exist, the question arises if we have to conclude that ‘nonterritorial 
clouds’ do not really exist either. In other words, is the cloud itself not territory? I do not mean this in 
the strict physical sense that clouds have servers that are located in territorial states, which itself is a 
valid point; yet the development of serverless cloud computing in the future might undermine such an 
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argument. To think of the cloud as somehow territory-less and border-less is incongruous if one 
appreciates that territory itself is not a natural phenomenon but a man-made construct the meaning of 
which is dynamic and can come to encompass non-physical spaces. 
Assumption 2: Cloud states cannot exert violence 
Focusing on violence in his comment, Michael Blake states: ‘My own challenge is broader: the 
protection of human rights, I believe, can only be accomplished by means of violence and force, in 
both policing and in punishment – and this violence is in our world reserved (as a matter of right, if 
not reality) for use by states.’ 
Blake argues that cloud states cannot protect human rights. A comparison with anti-separationists 
in the French Revolution is again not far away: they would claim that ‘secular states cannot protect 
God’s law’. To make his argument, Blake relies heavily on state force. But why could cloud states not 
impose their own forms of digital violence? Perhaps an obvious damage they could inflict is to one’s 
reputation. An example of this is the social credit system proposed by the Chinese government, which 
is a national reputation system that assigns social credit to citizens. The flipside of such reputation 
systems that aim to promote ‘good citizenship’ behaviour is the potential social devaluation of ‘bad’ 
citizens, which can go as far as seriously harming their wellbeing and possibilities in life. A 
punishment in terms of such social devaluation imposed by the cloud state is conceivably more painful 
and restricting to the individual than traditional methods of punishment, such as fines or jail. 
As with territory, one could counter this claim by saying that what matters for statehood is 
physical, rather than non-physical, violence. In that case, the actual core of the matter is the physicality 
of the traditional state’s territory and violence compared to the non-physicality of the cloud state’s 
territory and violence. That raises a question that is yet to be addressed by proponents of cloud states: 
What is desirable about the non-physicality of territory and violence that makes cloud states and their 
citizenship superior to traditional states and their citizenship? 
Assumption 3: Cloud state membership is based on choice 
Focusing on the idea of consent-based cloud communities, Rainer Bauböck writes: ‘My response is 
that this would be fatal for democracy. Already Aristotle knew that, unlike families, democratic 
polities are associations of diverse individuals. The territorial bases and automatic attribution 
mechanisms of citizenship create political community among individuals that differ profoundly in 
their interests, identities and ideas about the common good.’ 
In short, for Bauböck choice cannot be constitutive for political membership (citizenship). Hence, 
the chosen membership of cloud states is not citizenship. This is a difficult topic, and the parallel with 
the earlier (French) revolution escapes me. The reason for this is that in the secular revolution 
separating Church and State the ‘onus’ of choice fell on the Church and not the State: It was religion 
and the freedom to choose individually one’s religion that was guaranteed by the secular state. By 
contrast, in the digital revolution separating Territory and State the opening up of choice is focused on 
the newfound states among which individuals can choose. In fact, one might even be limited in exiting 
from a territory (think refugees, political activists) yet have the freedom to select from a range of cloud 
states one wants to join.  
Yet, the notions of choice and voluntariness applied in this context leave many questions 
unanswered. It is still unclear in what way we understand membership in a cloud state to be a ‘choice’. 
The Chinese social credit system mentioned earlier may become mandatory as of 2020. Such a turn 
towards explicitly mandatory membership will probably not always happen, but what idea of choice 
do we have in mind when saying that cloud membership is a ‘choice’? Is it rational choice theory, 
which has long been refuted in psychology? The conditions that move people to decide on their cyber 
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membership, as well as their non-rational motivations, have to be taken into account for a more 
realistic conception of choice.  
The question of chosen membership is closely related to issues concerning identity. The idea that 
individuals are able to ‘create’ their own identities, which is implicit in Liav Orgad’s contribution, is 
mistaken. Iris Marion Young makes a helpful distinction between associations and social groups to 
tease out the distinct role of identity when membership is based on choice. Young argues that that the 
contract model of society applies to associations but not to social groups: ‘Individuals constitute 
associations; they come together as already formed persons and set them up, establishing rules, 
positions, and offices.’ (my emphasis).2 In contrast, social groups, in which our identities are 
implicated, involve a much more complex process: ‘Group affinity (…) has the character of (…) 
“thrownness”: one finds oneself as a member of a group, whose existence and relations one 
experiences as always already having been.’ This does not mean that one cannot change one’s group 
affinity, for example by changing one’s gender identity as trans-persons do. For Young, these cases 
illustrate thrownness precisely because such changes are ‘experienced as a transformation in one’s 
identity.’ This phenomenological approach to social groups shows that a deeper affinity is involved in 
the process of membership and that social groups, which implicate our identity, cannot be explained 
solely by ‘choice’. Young and Bauböck therefore agree that citizenship and choice are irreconcilable, 
though they do so from different standpoints: for Bauböck the presence of choice in communities 
leads to a democratic deficit, for Young it leads to a social deficit, a lack of social affinity or 
belonging. To respond to this complex debate relating to membership, the nature of cloud membership 
requires further clarification as to its position on citizenship, identity and choice. 
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Jelena Dzankic* 
I have always been fascinated by the human capacity to imagine future worlds and describe what 
humanity would look like in the years or decades ahead. In the second half of the nineteenth century, 
Jules Verne wrote about electricity, submarines and flying balloons. A few decades later, Thea von 
Harbou and Fritz Lang gave birth to the world of Metropolis, which in many ways is a metaphor of 
contemporary societies. In the 1970s and 1980s, Isaac Asimov wrote about psychohistory, a discipline 
that combines statistics, psychology and history to predict how the behaviour of large groups would 
shape future events. Just as most of the things described by Verne, von Harbou and Lang, or Asimov 
seemed technologically and politically distant or unimaginable at their times, so do meaningful digital 
communities seem to be today.  
Liav Orgad sees tremendous potential in digital technologies for reconstructing the traditional 
notion of citizenship by shifting status, identity and the exercise of rights away from the state and 
closer to the individual. He believes that blockchain could enhance the current structure of 
international governance by strengthening human rights through the attribution of digital identities and 
by offering new models for political participation through cloud communities, which in turn would 
decrease the inequality engrained in, for instance, the principles of voting in the United Nations. In 
other words, with further development of blockchain technologies, states would no longer be the sole 
determinants of an individual’s legal status, or have the monopoly over the exercise of individual 
rights, or be the core community for identity ascription. In this sense, I am in agreement with Orgad, 
Primavera De Filippi and Francesca Strumia that we cannot but acknowledge that rapidly developing 
technologies are likely to ‘outsource’ many of the state’s functions to cyberspace. Even so, as has been 
pointed out by other contributors (Rainer Bauböck, Robert Post, Michael Blake and Peter Spiro), 
blockchain technologies and cloud communities raise a number of concerns about governability and 
the exercise of self-sovereignty.  
They want citizenship? Let them have digital identities instead! 
In his kick-off contribution Orgad highlights that 1.1 billion people, or a sixth of the global 
population lack an official identification. Such people, including many refugees, displaced persons, 
nomadic pastoralists or socially marginalised minorities like the Roma are consequently excluded 
from participating in or accessing services of modern states. According to Orgad, blockchain 
technologies already provide the infrastructure for attributing such people global digital IDs, which 
would grant them recognition as ‘human beings’. Blockchain-based digital IDs would enable 
individuals to create and register their own identity. This identity would be validated through multiple 
decentralised network nodes. It would also be permanent and immutable.  
I agree with the general need to recognise every human being before the law. However, the 
attribution of a global digital ID scarcely resolves this problem for two reasons. The first one is 
recognition. Our legal status is attributed by states recognising us as legal persons. The international 
system of mutual recognition among states allows us to be considered a legal persona elsewhere 
precisely because the status that we have has been confirmed by a state. Hence, any global digital ID 
would still need to be recognised by states or an international organisation in order to have external 
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validity. Initiatives, such as ID2020
1
 speak about the need to tackle the problem of the lack of 
‘officially recognised identity’ through digital technology but offer scarcely any practical pointers as 
to how these identities would be recognised and by whom. Furthermore, if such digital identification 
were to create a ‘status and identity complementary to national citizenships’, I am wondering what 
kind of status and rights it would yield for those whose predicament Orgad seeks to resolve. If a digital 
ID has no external recognition, it has little value for a person with no other proof of identity. They will 
still lack the status that a digital identity could complement but cannot substitute for. Isn’t the offer of 
digital identity for them a bit like Marie Antoinette’s cake for the hungry crowds in revolutionary 
Paris? 
Governance by blockchain: digital hierarchies or direct democracy?  
Orgad’s second claim looks prima facie stronger. Recent experiments with blockchain-based virtual 
communities, such as Bitnation, indicate that blockchain technology has the potential to substitute or 
complement some elements of state governance. In theory, in a blockchain-based cloud community, 
members agree on a set of laws regulating their interaction, and these laws are then amended by 
consensus. 
Pazaitis, De Filippi and Kostakis give the example of Backfeed (http://backfeed.cc/) protocol as a 
conceptual model ‘for a new form of governance with an incentivisation system implemented on the 
blockchain.’2 This system would be materialised through an organisational structure of decentralised 
cooperation based on peer-to-peer evaluation and a reputation system as grounds for allocating 
communal influence. This kind of cooperation would presume that a number of members come 
together to establish a digital community and reach a consensus on what values underpin that 
community. Members of the community own certain initial amounts of ‘reputation’ tokens and they 
are incentivised to participate in communal decisions through a system that provides reputational gains 
to those who are best aligned with communal values. Those contributing voluntarily to ‘values’ 
receive a reward if 50 per cent of the tokens representing the community’s reputation have been 
invested in the evaluation of the voluntary contribution. The reward takes the form of reputation 
tokens, which are shared between the contributor and those who reached the consensus on the 
evaluation. Whenever a person evaluates a new contribution, they also give away some of their 
existing reputation to it.  
Let’s translate this into a thought experiment. Imagine there is a Backfeed-based community called 
Scientia, in which the core value were ‘knowledge’. Scientia has been created by five members (A, B, 
C, D, and E), each of whom originally had 10 reputation tokens (i.e., the community has a total of 50 
tokens). Member A comes up with a proposal to create an encyclopaedia of cloud communities and 
the proposal is put to communal vote. Votes can range from 1 to 5 (1 lowest contribution, 5 highest 
contribution). The proposal will go through if at least 25 reputation tokens have been invested in the 
evaluation.  
Now, imagine a scenario where A invests 8 out of her initial 10 reputation tokens with a vote of 5; 
B invests 5 tokens with a vote of 5; C invests 3 tokens with a vote of 3; D invests 5 tokens with a vote 
of 4; E invests 7 tokens with a vote of 5. A total of 28 tokens have been invested, with three 
contributors voting 5, and hence the proposal is accepted. C and D will lose the 8 tokens they invested, 
and these will be distributed between A (4 tokens), B (3 tokens), and E (1 token) in line with their 
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initial reputation investment. The new count of reputation tokens would be 14 for A, 13 for B, 7 for C, 
5 for D, and 11 for E. In evaluating the subsequent proposal, A, B and E would have greater voting 
power, as they would hold three quarters of the community’s reputation tokens.  
In my view, there are three problems with this kind of decision-making. First, the ‘overall 
evaluation of a specific contribution is based on the reputation score’.3 This implies the use of a 
system of weighted voting, whereby individuals with higher reputation (i.e., with more tokens) have a 
greater say in communal decision-making. Paradoxically this would make the principles of deciding in 
such digital communities closer to those in ancient Rome, feudal Prussia, or French colonies where 
votes were weighted on grounds of ‘wealth’ than to contemporary democracies based on the equality 
of votes. In other words, this kind of system would perpetuate inequality of membership in a similar 
way as the Chinese social credit system described by Costica Dumbrava does. Second, even though 
the general idea of Backfeed-based governance is to incentivise participation through rewards, those 
with high rewards from previous rounds of evaluations may be less inclined to participate in new 
evaluations as that may result in their loss of reputation. Equally, ‘losers’ in the communal vote (such 
as the examples of C and D above) may face obstacles in putting forward or voting for any proposal 
due to limited resources at their disposal. Third, such a system could create incentives to bet with the 
winners rather than to invest into the values that one truly believes are in line with communal ones. 
This is antithetical to democracy and turns into a market where people pursue reputational gains 
instead of deliberating on what values they share. That is, a system in which reputation is gained and 
lost by ‘betting’ on the levels of contribution to communal value has the potential to create a stratified 
society in which decisions are made by a small number of those willing to speculate on communal 
value.  
An alternative to this would be to think how direct democracy could work in cloud communities. 
Presumably, protocols could be developed that – unlike Backfeed – base decision-making on equal 
voting power for each digital identity and that offer a platform for deliberation rather than only for 
voting. Such communities would be similar to voluntary associations of individuals that adopt statutes 
providing for internally democratic governance: all members (independently of their duration of 
membership and place of residence) and members only can participate in decisions taken by the 
‘demos’ of the association.  
Now, let’s go back to the example of Scientia. Imagine that this time, Scientia were a voluntary 
decentralised blockchain-based community that operates on the basis of equal votes of its members A, 
B, C, D, and E. The community votes on A’s proposal for the encyclopaedia of cloud communities 
and the proposal passes due to positive votes of A, B, and E. Unlike in the previous example, since 
there are no reputational gains or losses, C and D will have the same voting power in the next ballot. 
Hence such a model would not disincentivise those who opposed the initiative. However, it would 
then not provide incentives for contributing in the future, as Backfeed is supposed to do. As Pazaitis, 
De Filippi and Kostakis rightly point out, this would lead to ‘to the gradual dissipation of the 
community members, who could no longer reflect themselves into the value system of the new 
entity.’4  
So there is a dilemma of blockchain governance in cloud communities: will they be based on 
incentives that create hierarchies or on direct democracy with scarce mechanisms for motivating 
participation? 
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Citizenship as a business model? 
In his kick-off contribution Orgad notes that the future of citizenship is dynamic and multi-layered. 
Yet so is the present, and so has been its past. The key question is whether we are ready to embrace a 
new approach to citizenship, based on ‘smart contracts’ operating in cyberspace and regulating needs 
of individuals, just as a business model would do. For Spiro the recent trend towards a global market 
for passports exemplifies such an approach to citizenship: individuals with multiple passports have 
more choice where to settle, pay taxes, send their children to school, etc. Hence, in some respects, 
citizenship (albeit for a small number of people who can benefit from investor citizenship 
programmes) is already merely an access point to a market of goods and services that different 
providers (in this case states) offer.  
As new technologies develop, digital markets will allow individuals to choose the services 
previously provided by the state from private companies. Indeed, some functions of the state have 
already been outsourced to companies operating in the digital world (e.g., online education instead of 
public schooling, car-sharing schemes instead of public transport, etc.). Perhaps the utopian vision of 
the ‘sharing economy’ is that public goods would be produced through horizontal and voluntary 
cooperation among consumers. Yet examples such as online degrees, Airbnb, Uber, and the likes 
prove the contrary. They follow the logic of the market and reveal the huge potential for corporate 
power based on network effects and ‘cartelisation’ of services.5 In considering the effects of 
citizenship as a business model, we also need to think about possible implications for some other core 
functions of the state, including adjudication and the provision of security.  
And even if, in the spirit of the introductory paragraph, digital technologies bring along numerous 
benefits we have to recognise that their á la carte approach is hardly conducive to the creation of a 
community of shared values among members. That is, it is hardly conducive to citizenship.
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Old Divides, New Devices: Global Citizenship for Only Half of the World 
Lea Ypi* 
There is no doubt that we live in an age of global communication. But who is able to communicate and 
how is access to the means that enable that communication (computers, mobile phones, internet lines) 
distributed? 
Consider again the facts of global interconnectedness with which Liav Orgad begins his piece. But 
consider them from a different perspective, not that of the wealthy Western academic who blogs about 
cloud communities. If half of the world population spends time online, it means that the other half 
does not. While 94 per cent of the youth population in the developed world has access to the internet, 
70 per cent of youngsters in least developed countries do not. While almost one-third of the global 
population uses smartphones, the other two-thirds (the vast majority) does not. If global internet use in 
2017 was at 48 per cent, 52 per cent of the world’s population was left out. In the least developed 
countries only 15 per cent of households have access to the internet from their homes and 85 per cent 
rely on schools, offices, libraries or other public connections to access the web. The proportion of men 
using the internet is higher than the proportion of women, and the proportion of private internet access 
in developed countries is twice as high as in developing ones.
1
 
All this suggests that the narrative of global interconnectedness on which the ideal of global 
citizenship rests is only half true and true only for half of the world. There is of course the claim that 
even for the half of the world that is connected, the technology might not work very well. There are 
the dangers of digital identities being stolen and of data centres, internet servers, and the rest of the 
infrastructure being vulnerable to hacking, as Dumbrava emphasises in his contribution. But my 
problem is even more basic. One of the most attractive features of global citizenship based on 
blockchain technologies seems to be that it does not entail the right to exclude. But either proponents 
of that ideal start with the world as it is, or they do not. If they take the world as it is, they endorse an 
even more pernicious form of exclusion, the exclusion of those who have no access to the internet 
from the community of those that do, and they proceed to reify the separation between the two. If they 
start with the world as it ought to be, they owe us an argument on how we can get from here to there. 
How can we make sure that the half of the world that has no access to the internet can do so? How are 
we going to take care of the costs of IT provision? What will put an end to the inequalities that make it 
the case that for some people (like me) mobile phones are an extension of themselves and for some 
others only an aspiration? Who controls the production of the tools that lead to differentiated access of 
the means of connection? 
It will be clear from my lines above that I approach the question of global citizenship presented in 
Orgad’s piece from a radical egalitarian perspective, concerned with inequalities of access to the 
material means of production, and the related power positions of those who control such access. In the 
contemporary world this means raising very basic questions, such as who owns Apple and Microsoft, 
and how we can make sure that everyone has a mobile phone that works as well in central London as it 
does in the remote areas of Albania (where it typically does not). Apple and Microsoft are the modern 
equivalents of cotton and spin factories. We have the same reasons to worry about who controls their 
ownership and who has access to the technologies that they enable as much now as we did in the past. 
But if we ignore the problem of asymmetrical access and proceed as if the internet was already within 
everybody’s reach, we run the risk of entrenching one of the most problematic divides of our time. 
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Given the perspective I have offered, I hesitate to show enthusiasm for Orgad’s proposal for 
reasons very different from those of Robert Post, Michael Blake or even Rainer Bauböck. My 
argument is not that cloud communities based on voluntary membership do not offer the benefits of a 
collective coercive system of rewards and punishments like the one offered by modern states. I do not 
think that states are necessarily either more just or more democratic than cloud communities, or that 
they ‘provide us with goods that cannot be provided by even the best systems of informational 
technology’ as Michael Blake suggests. If you are a representative of the half of the world that has 
nothing to do with the internet you are of course failed by IT providers, but you are also failed by your 
state. Indeed, you are failed by those providers precisely because you are failed by your state. It is 
because the state is captured by powerful groups who merely exploit you and who are uninterested in 
guaranteeing you access to those basic goods that the state is supposed to guarantee (at least according 
to the liberal myth) that you are excluded within the state as much as outside.  
When we assess the benefits and limitations of state citizenship versus a voluntary model of global 
citizenship, we have to make sure that we compare like with like. We have to make sure we don’t 
compare an ideal of the state with the reality of failing blockchain technologies, for example. We need 
to compare the reality of the state with the reality of cloud communities or the ideal of the state with 
the ideal of cloud communities. Speaking about ideals, like Orgad, I am attracted to a system of 
voluntary membership where citizenship does not come coupled with the right to exclude, and like De 
Filippi I can see the advantages of ‘trustless systems (i.e. system where trust is no longer needed).’ 
Indeed, both of those things are compatible with the kind of utopian society Marx thought would come 
after capitalism had been superseded and when the need for a state (understood as a collective coercive 
system of punishment) would have withered away. But speaking about reality, capitalism is alive and 
kicking: capitalist relations control the state and they will control cloud communities. Without 
remedying the asymmetries of access to the means of connection, and the exclusions they generate, the 
ideal of global citizenship will be as illusory as the ideal of a state that is effective in distributing 
social goods. But while in the case of the state, we have at least a history of political mobilisation and, 
if lucky, democratic learning processes and institutions on which to rely when seeking change (as 
Bauböck also points out in his piece), nothing of that sort is available in the cloud. So we should 
probably hold on to state citizenship for the conflictual period of transition and leave cloud 
communities to the future utopian society that may become accessible once interconnectedness is truly 
global. If it ever does. 
 
 47 
Escapist Technology in the Service of Neo-Feudalism 
Dimitry Kochenov 
*
 
This contribution agrees with Rainer Bauböck’s reaction to Liav Orgad’s opening statement. I am, too, 
‘less optimistic about the future of citizenship’. My reasons are different though. There are different 
ways to go about technological leaps: to turn technological breakthroughs into the tools of improving 
the long-established reality, or to revolutionize society based on technological advancements. Nikolai 
Fëdorov, to give an ambitious example, aimed at conquering death and resurrecting all those 
previously living.
1
 Liav Orgad’s text proposes technology-inspired change. I suggest, respectfully, that 
by not going far enough, what is proposed by Orgad could turn out to be dangerous and unwelcome 
for a large share of the world population outside of the richest countries. Echoing Lea Ypi’s 
contribution, I suggest that it will do more harm than good. The reason for this is that it puts 
technology to the service of the mythology of citizenship, instead of interrogating citizenship’s 
essence and functions and questioning its darker corners. 
The core of the problem, to my mind, is the concept of citizenship as such, not the documentation 
of identity, which the blockchain proposal addresses. Virtual nations, as long as they replicate existing 
national structures that randomly ascribe strict identities and reinforce deep global inequalities, will 
make the world worse off, especially among its poorest half. Even if they miraculously end up playing 
a significant role, the citizenship framing of the issues Orgad aims to address seems to be unhelpful 
and problematic, especially in the context of his rhetoric aspiring to reach out to ‘global’ citizenship, 
whatever this could mean.  
Citizenship is a racist and sexist status of randomised violent segregation of the world population 
into relatively closed groups of varying objective value from the point of view of individual rights.
2
 
Some come with far-reaching rights – others with liabilities. Both are significant both in real life and 
in the cloud. If someone is assigned a humiliating set of liabilities in real life, say, a Central African 
Republic citizenship, instead of a noble and democratic status boosting one’s rights, say the citizenship 
of France, cloud communities will not change that, unless the distinction between being assigned to 
CAR as opposed to France is thereby undermined, and based on Orgad’s suggestion it won’t be. The 
‘real life’ problem thus derives from real life inequalities between citizenships as bundles of rights and 
liabilities. It is not only that citizenships by definition exclude. It is the difference between different 
citizenships that matters. As long as these two premises persist in shaping our day-to-day reality, a 
‘global’ cloud community is a meaningless proposition for those who hold inferior citizenships, 
reinforcing the gaps between CAR citizens and the French.  
Citizenship’s core function throughout history, alongside sexism and a deep exclusion of women, 
has been to establish and police global race- and wealth-based hierarchies of opportunities and rights, 
while providing an impenetrable and punishing noble façade of equality and self-determination. In 
this, citizenship has been very effective: it took US women almost hundred years to get the right to 
vote and the Dutch ones waited until 1986 to have a citizenship status independent of that of their 
husbands. Compared with women, all the colonial subjects fared significantly worse. While African 
Americans obviously have not been enjoying the same rights as ‘Caucasian’ US citizens throughout 
the history of US citizenship, the same is true for the European and Asian empires as well. 
Emmanuelle Saada explains how arbitrary and uniquely based on skin-colour the ascription of 
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Frenchness in the colonies of the Republic was.
3
 What decolonisation brought, however, was a racial 
segregation of the world under the banner of equal citizenship among equal states. All the former 
colonial subjects are now confined to the places around the world reserved uniquely for the losers of 
Ayelet Shachar’s infamous birthright lottery.4 The only difference compared with seventy years ago is 
that there is no more French judge in the former colony, whom you can beg for a drastic status 
upgrade for your child, capitalising on her unexpected blue eyes – racism is outlawed, remember?  
The world has thus both changed and remained the same. It changed, because since the Second 
World War the Western world has come to accept women as the bearers of citizenship status 
independent of their sexual partners and even grants them political rights. Racial minorities within 
‘first world’ states are also respected – both on paper and often in practice too. The façade of 
citizenship as a status of equals seems to have met – for the first time since its proclamation by 
Aristotle – its promise. Yet the world has also remained hugely unequal. Branko Milanovic teaches us 
that, although global income inequalities have recently declined when measured by country averages, 
country of residence is more important than class today.
5
 Even the ‘occupy Wall Street’ guys belong in 
fact to the world’s elites, they are only not able to realise the depth of misery of others. Indeed, those 
locked into the poorest former colonies do not inhabit the same narrative as Europeans and Americans. 
The main purpose of citizenship has been upgraded: from a neo-feudal mechanism of sexist and racist 
governance, it is turning into one of the core instruments of preservation and justification of global 
inequality, hiding its functionality behind the old façade of political self-determination, which had 
been effective to brush away women and minorities before. 
Citizenships are thus about preserving inequality worldwide. As long as segregating remains 
citizenships’ main function, cloud communities are powerless in their mission: identities are irrelevant 
as long as all the life chances or the lack thereof depend on a random legal status of ascription to 
authority distributed at birth. Worse still, humiliation and randomness are routinely sanctified: while 
upholding and perpetuating inequality, citizenship supplies a powerful and ultimately pointless 
narrative justifying random privilege through the glorification of expediency in territorial governance.  
The lack of any rights worldwide coming with some citizenships as opposed to a huge bundle of 
rights coming with others can be measured. By comparing GDP, HDI, travel freedom and settlement 
and work rights abroad it is easy to see why being born French – with a status welcoming you to the 
job market of 41 countries and all the other perks included – is infinitely better than being a Ukrainian 
or, God forbid, an Afghani. The Quality of Nationality Index, which I designed together with Chris 
Kälin shows this in the most graphic way (http://www.nationalityindex.com). For ordinary people this 
is not all theory: the boats crossing the Mediterranean are full and they cross the sea in one direction 
only. My point is, they will be going the same way no matter what cloud communities are introduced, 
since the violence of global segregation that citizenship inflicts cannot be affected by the technology 
proclaiming an abstract ‘global citizenship’ to be a value and reaffirming it in the cloud. 
Before discussing the potential benefits of a set of quasi-citizenships in the cloud it is crucial to be 
fully aware of the drastic differences between citizenships in ‘real life’ and fully internalise their 
ability to punish besides simply segregating at random. Pace Arendt’s ‘right to have tights’ citizenship 
is a status associated with rights in a handful of countries only. In many others, it is a severe and 
undeserved liability and sometimes a mortal one. What blockchain offers to a Frenchmen will thus be 
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radically different from what it offers to a Congolese (pick your Congo!). When refugees arrive in 
Europe or America, they often destroy, sometimes even eat, their passports. Have you tried to consider 
why? It is because many citizenships are so terribly poisonous and dangerous that you might be 
infinitely better off as a stateless person. This is because with a Central African Republic passport 
your child born in Brussels will be a Central African, not a Belgian, because you will need to wait for 
naturalisation longer and, ultimately, because CAR will have to accept you back once you are out of 
the Belgian asylum system. To be identifiable is always as bad a liability as the citizenship or the place 
of birth you will be identified with. It can ruin lives. This is where cloud communities come in as an 
impermissibly rosy dream. The proposal ignores the complexity of the world and fails to fully come to 
terms with its own dangers in the context of the current functions of citizenship behind the self-
justificatory sacred façade put up uniquely for those who somehow happen to belong to the right 
country in order to let them sleep tight at night.  
Citizenship’s inescapable evil does not stem from the fact that it is a randomly assigned benefit, but 
from the reality that it is about branding as deficient those who are randomly proclaimed not to belong 
while treating such exclusion as self-explanatory and just. This justice is ethically void, however, as 
long as we believe that it is humanity that counts morally and that obliges us to respect others’ desire 
to live a worthy life, as Joseph Carens has demonstrated.
6
 Should this indeed be our starting point, any 
serious work to perfect the current citizenship paradigm – either on the ground or in the cloud – is 
nothing else but work that opposes ethical imperatives we all share. The untenability of citizenship’s 
ethical narrative, no matter which way of telling it one chooses, is the elephant in the room, which 
ultimately explains the on-going demise of the citizenship of the ‘good old times’: a random 
supremacist status for armed white boys who belong and believe in the greatness of their land, 
whatever it might be, often at the expense of all their neighbours.  
How do the cloud communities proposed by Orgad fit Joppke’s story of the ‘inevitable lightening 
of citizenship’?7 In the former imperial centres such luxury as new online associations emerging 
through the individual sovereign governance of identity with the help of blockchain as Orgad 
describes it is only welcome – our world is open and ripe with opportunities – in the cloud and on the 
ground. About the rest of the world I am somewhat sceptical: as Robert Post has already suggested in 
his contribution, life in the place where you are is something that is of crucial importance, more than 
your cloud identity, whatever that would come to mean. And as Michael Blake points out, violence in 
the physical world is equally crucial. Work and education of your choosing, residence abroad, freedom 
of belief and expression, an ability to be with your loved ones, to go places – this is what a Saudi 
citizenship, now grotesquely granted to a robot, will no doubt deny you, especially if you are a 
woman. Using technology for escapism is something that falls far short, it seems to me, of its 
potential. A cloud community will not even save you from beheading in Saudi Arabia for confessing 
atheism online, for instance, or, if you happen to be a Chinese national, spending three years in jail for 
calling Mr Xi a ‘steam bun’ in a private chat conversation in your cloud.  
Once escapism has been discarded, it becomes necessary to consider what cloud communities 
could be good for. And in doing so it is our imperative not to replicate the repugnant nature of 
citizenship as a justificatory label for random privilege and for explaining away global inequality. 
Here Estonia shows the way, as Poleshchuk has demonstrated.
8
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It is not the cloud identity, – I am gay in the cloud since otherwise the government will kill me – it 
is the functional added value of the virtual statuses and ‘residences’ that should come to the fore. What 
I am saying is that clubs, no matter whether offline or in the cloud, have nothing to do with 
citizenships, since citizenships are involuntary and do not foster common interests or values. 
Consequently, calling any cloud identities ‘citizenship’ is a misconception. One needs to move on 
from citizenship when technology allows. What is possible today – and this is a great beginning 
Estonia started – is to use online residences as compensation mechanisms for the deficiencies of the 
statuses of citizenship, which the vast majority of the world’s population got by birth. You are born in 
Afghanistan? Fine, with an Estonian residency online you can at least open a proper bank account and 
have access to basic state services – notaries, company registers etc. This is a primary use of new 
digital technologies. 
A second purpose – and this one should be based on a broad agreement between states – is to use 
attested individual identities to judge people by those, rather than their passports. Crucially, these 
cannot go hand in hand. The core added value would be to replace one with the other. We are a long 
way from here and the connection between the cloud and ‘real life’ is crucial here, but what one can 
envisage is a world where babies in Afghanistan or Pakistan are born without at least some of the 
drastic harmful effects of the original sin of nationality and that peoples’ worth at international borders 
is assessed via some factors other than the particular state that has been claiming the possession of 
them from birth. This should be the future of technological thinking to bring true liberation from the 
neo-feudal essence of a poisonous status, which is ethically vacuous, its political expediency 
notwithstanding. A technological revolution should not become a servant of the status quo, erecting 
yet higher walls between the haves and have-nots. 
 51 
Cloud Communities and the Materiality of the Digital 
Stefania Milan
*
  
As a digital sociologist, I have always found ‘classical’ political scientists and lawyers a tad too 
reluctant to embrace the idea that digital technology is a game changer in so many respects. In the 
debate spurred by Liav Orgad’s provocative thoughts on blockchain-enabled cloud communities, I am 
particularly fascinated by the tension between techno-utopianism on the one hand (above all, Orgad 
and Primavera De Filippi), and socio-legal realism on the other (e.g., Rainer Bauböck, Michael Blake, 
Lea Ypi, Jelena Dzankic, Dimitry Kochenov). I find myself somewhere in the middle. In what follows, 
I take a sociological perspective to explain why there is something profoundly interesting in the notion 
of cloud communities, why however little of it is really new, and why the obstacles ahead are bigger 
than we might like to think. The point of departure for my considerations is a number of experiences 
in the realm of transnational social movements and governance: what we can learn from existing 
experiments that might help us contextualize and rethink cloud communities?  
Three problems with Orgad’s argument 
To start with, while I sympathise with Orgad’s provocative claims, I cannot but notice that what he 
deems new in cloud communities – namely the global dimension of political membership and its 
networked nature – is indeed rather old. Since the 1990s, transnational social movements for global 
justice have offered non-territorial forms of political membership – not unlike those described as cloud 
communities. Similar to cloud communities, these movements were the manifestation of political 
communities based on consent, gathered around shared interests and only minimally rooted in physical 
territories corresponding to nation states.
1
 In the fall of 2011 I observed with earnest interest the 
emergence of yet another global wave of contention: the so-called Occupy mobilisation. As a 
sociologist of the web, I set off in search for a good metaphor to capture the evolution of organised 
collective action in the age of social media, and the obvious candidate was… the cloud. In a series of 
articles
2
 and book chapters,
3
 I developed my theory of ‘cloud protesting’, intended to capture how the 
algorithmic environment of social media alters the dynamics of organized collective action. In light of 
my empirical work, I agree with Bauböck, who acknowledges that cloud communities might have 
something to do with the ‘expansion of civil society, of international organizations, or of traditional 
territorial polities into cyberspace.’ He also points out how, sadly, people can express their political 
views – and, I would add, engage in disruptive actions, as happens at some fringes of the movement 
for global justice – only because ‘a secure territorial citizenship’ protects their exercise of fundamental 
rights, such as freedom of expression and association. Hence the questions a sociologist might ask: do 
we really need the blockchain to enable the emergence of cloud communities? If, as I argue, the 
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existence of ‘international legal personas’ is not a pre-requisite for the establishment of cloud 
communities, what would the creation of ‘international legal personas’ add to the picture?4 
Secondly, while I understand why a blockchain-enabled citizenship system would make life easier 
for the many who do not have access to a regular passport, I am wary of its ‘institutionalisation’, on 
account of the probable discrepancies between the ideas (and the mechanisms) associated with a 
Westphalian state and those of politically active activists and radical technologists alike. On the one 
hand, citizens interested in ‘advanced’ forms of political participation (e.g., governance and the 
making of law) might not necessarily be inclined to form a state-like entity. For example, many 
accounts of the so-called ‘movement for global justice’5 show how ‘official’ membership and 
affiliation is often not required, not expected and especially not considered desirable. Activism today 
is characterised by a dislike and distrust of the state, and a tendency to privilege flexible, multiple 
identities.
6
 On the other hand, the ‘radical technologists’ behind the blockchain project are animated 
by values – an imaginaire7 – deeply distinct from that of the state.8 While the blockchain technology is 
enabled by a complex constellation of diverse actors, it is legitimate to ask whether it is possible to 
bend a technology built with an ‘underlying philosophy of distributed consensus, open source, 
transparency and community’ with the goal to ‘be highly disruptive’9 … to serve similar purposes as 
those of states? 
Thirdly, Orgad’s argument falls short of a clear description of what the ‘cloud’ stands for in his 
notion of cloud communities. When thinking about ‘clouds’, as a metaphor and a technical term, we 
cannot but think of cloud computing, a ‘key force in the changing international political economy’10 of 
our times, which entails a process of centralisation of software and hardware allowing users to reduce 
costs by sharing resources. The cloud metaphor, I argued elsewhere,
11
 is an apt one as it exposes a 
fundamental ambivalence of contemporary processes of ‘socio-legal decentralisation.’ While claiming 
distance from the values and dynamics of the neoliberal state, a project of building blockchain-enabled 
communities still relies on commercially-owned infrastructure to function.  
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Precisely to reflect on this ambiguity, my most recent text on cloud protesting interrogates the 
materiality of the cloud
12
. We have long lived in the illusion that the internet was a space free of 
geography. Yet, as IR scholar Ron Deibert argued, ‘physical geography is an essential component of 
cyberspace: Where technology is located is as important as what it is’ (original italics).13 The Snowden 
revelations, to name just one, have brought to the forefront the role of the national state in – openly or 
covertly – setting the rules of user interactions online. What’s more, we no longer can blame the state 
alone, but the ‘surveillant assemblage’ of state and corporations.14 To me, the big absent in this debate 
is the private sector and corporate capital. De Filippi briefly mentioned how the ‘new communities of 
kinship’ are anchored in ‘a variety of online platforms’. However, what Orgav’s and partially also 
Bauböck’s contributions underscore is the extent to which intermediation by private actors stands in 
the way of creating a real alternative to the state – or at least the fulfilment of certain dreams of 
autonomy, best represented today by the fascination for blockchain technology. Bauböck rightly notes 
that ‘state and corporations... will find ways to instrumentalise or hijack cloud communities for their 
own purposes.’ But there is more to that: the infrastructure we use to enable our interpersonal 
exchanges and, why not, the blockchain, are owned and controlled by private interests subjected to 
national laws. They are not merely neutral pipes, as Dumbrava reminds us.  
Self-governance in practice: A cautionary tale 
To be sure, many experiments allow ‘individuals the option to raise their voice … in territorial 
communities to which they do not physically belong,’ as beautifully put by Francesca Strumia. 
Internet governance is a case in point. Since the early days of the internet, cyberlibertarian ideals, 
enshrined for instance in the ‘Declaration of Independence of Cyberspace’15 by late JP Barlow, have 
attributed little to no role to governments – both in deciding the rules for the ‘new’ space as well as the 
citizenship of its users (read: the right to participate in the space and in the decision-making about the 
rules governing it). In those early flamboyant narratives, cyberspace was to be a space where users – 
but really engineers above all – would translate into practice their wildest dreams in matter of self-
governance, self-determination and, to some extent, fairness. While cyberlibertarian views have been 
appropriated by both conservative (anti-state) and progressive forces alike, some of their founding 
principles have spilled over to real governance mechanisms – above all the governance of standards 
and protocols by the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), and the management of the Domain 
Name System (DNS) by the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN).
16
 Here 
I focus on the latter, where I have been active for about four years (2014-2017).  
ICANN is organized in constituencies of stakeholders, including contracted parties (the 
‘middlemen’, that is to say registries and registrars that on a regional base allocate and manage on 
behalf of ICANN the names and numbers, and whose relationship with ICANN is regulated by 
contract), non-contracted parties (corporations doing business on the DNS, e.g. content or 
infrastructure providers) and non-commercial internet users (read: us). ICANN’s proceedings are fully 
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recorded and accessible from its website (https://www.icann.org/); its public meetings, thrice a year 
and rotating around the globe, are open to everyone who wants to walk in. Governments are 
represented in a sort of United Nations-style entity called the Government Advisory Committee. While 
corporate interests are well-represented by an array of professional lobbyists, the Non-Commercial 
Stakeholder Group (NCSG), which stands in for civil society,
17
 is a mix and match of advocates of 
various extraction, expertise and nationality: internet governance academics, nongovernmental 
organisations promoting freedom of expression, and independent individuals who take an interest in 
the functioning of the logical layer of the internet.  
The 2016 transition of the stewardship over the DNS from the US Congress to the ‘global 
multistakeholder community’ has achieved a dream unique in its kind, straight out of the 
cyberlibertarian vision of the early days: the technical oversight of the internet
18
 is in the hands of the 
people who make and use it, and the (advisory) role of the state is marginal. Accountability now rests 
solely within the community behind ICANN, which envisioned (and is still implementing) a complex 
system of checks and balances to allow the various stakeholder voices to be fairly represented. No 
other critical infrastructure is regulated by its own users. To build on Orgad’s reasoning, the 
community around ICANN is a cloud community, which operates by voluntary association and 
consensus,
19
 and is entitled to produce ‘governance and the creation of law’.20 
But the system is far from perfect. Let’s look at how the so-called civil society is represented, 
focusing on one such entity, the NCSG. Firstly, given that everyone can participate, the variety of 
views represented is enormous, and often hinders the ability of the constituency to be effective in 
policy negotiations. Yet, the size of the group is relatively small: at the time of writing, the Non-
Commercial User Constituency (the bigger one among the two that form the NCSG) comprises ‘538 
members from 161 countries, including 118 noncommercial organizations and 420 individuals’21, 
making it the largest constituency within ICANN: this is nothing when compared to the global internet 
population it serves, confirming, as Dzankic argues, that ‘direct democracy is not necessarily 
conducive to broad participation in decision-making’. Secondly, ICANN policy-making is highly 
technical and specialised; the learning curve is dramatically steep. Thirdly, to be effective, the amount 
of time a civil society representative should spend on ICANN is largely incompatible with regular 
daily jobs; civil society cannot compete with corporate lobbyists. Fourthly, with ICANN meetings 
rotating across the globe, one needs to be on the road for at least a month per year, with considerable 
personal and financial costs.
22
 In sum, while participation is in principle open to everyone, informed 
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participation has much higher access barriers, which have to do with expertise, time, and financial 
resources.
23
  
As a result, we observe a number of dangerous distortions of political representation. For example, 
when only the highly motivated participate, the views and ‘imaginaries’ represented are often at the 
opposite ends of the spectrum.
24
 Only the most involved really partake in decision-making, in a 
mechanism which is well known in sociology: the ‘tyranny of structurelessness’,25 which is typical of 
participatory, consensus-based organising. The extreme personalisation of politics that we observe 
within civil society at ICANN – a small group of long-term advocates with high personal stakes – 
yields also another similar mechanism, known as ‘the tyranny of emotions’,26 by which the most 
invested, independently of the suitability of their curricula vitae, end up assuming informal leadership 
roles – and, as the case of ICANN shows, even in presence of formal and carefully weighted 
governance structures. Decision-making is thus based on a sort of ‘microconsensus’ within small 
decision-making cliques.
27
 To make things worse, ICANN is increasingly making exceptions to its 
own, community-established rules, largely under the pressure of corporations as well as law 
enforcement: for example, the corporation has recently been accused of bypassing consensus policy-
making through voluntary agreements ad private contracting.
28
  
Why not (yet?): On new divides and bad players 
In conclusion, while I value the possibilities the blockchain technology opens for experimentation as 
much as Primavera De Filippi, I do not believe it will really solve our problems in the short to middle-
term. Rather, as it is always with technology because of its inherent political nature,
29
 new conflicts 
will emerge – and they will concern both its technical features and its governance.  
Earlier contributors to this debate have raised important concerns which are worth listening to. 
Besides Bauböck’s concerns over the perils for democracy represented by a consensus-based, self-
governed model, endorsed also by Blake, I want to echo Lea Ypi’s reminder of the enormous potential 
for exclusion embedded in technologies, as digital skills (but also income) are not equally distributed 
across the globe. For the time being, a citizenship model based on blockchain technology would be for 
the elites only, and would contribute to create new divides and to amplify existing ones. The first 
fundamental step towards the cloud communities envisioned by Orgad would thus see the state 
stepping in (once again) and being in charge of creating appropriate data and algorithmic literacy 
programmes whose scope is out of reach for corporations and the organised civil society alike.  
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There is more to that, however. The costs to our already fragile ecosystem of the blockchain 
technology are on the rise along with its popularity. These infrastructures are energy-intensive: talking 
about the cryptocurrency Bitcoin, tech magazine Motherboard estimated that each transaction 
consumes 215 Kilowatt-hour of electricity – the equivalent of the weekly consumption of an American 
household.
30
 A world built on blockchain would have a vast environmental footprint.
31
 Once again, the 
state might play a role in imposing adequate regulation mindful of the environmental costs of such 
programs.  
But I do not intend to glorify the role of the state. On the contrary, I believe we should also watch 
out for any attempts by the state to curb innovation. The relatively brief history of digital technology, 
and even more that of the internet, is awash with examples of late but extremely damaging state 
interventions. As soon as a given technology performs roles or produces information that are of 
interest to the state (e.g., interpersonal communications), the state wants to jump in, and often does so 
in pretty clumsy ways. The recent surveillance scandals have abundantly shown how state powers 
firmly inhabit the internet
32
 – and, as the Cambridge Analytica case33 reminds us, so do corporate 
interests. Moreover, the two are, more often than not, dangerously aligned.  
I do not intend, with my cautionary tales, to hinder any imaginative effort to explore the 
possibilities offered by blockchain to rethink how we understand and practice citizenship today. The 
case of Estonia shows that different models based on alternative infrastructure are possible, at least on 
the small scale and in presence of a committed state. As scholars we ought to explore those 
possibilities. Much work is needed, however, before we can proclaim the blockchain revolution.
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While developments in information technology have always sparked lively debates about democratic 
participation and citizenship, the advent of blockchain technology promises to change the concept and 
nature of participatory citizenship by providing an inclusive, secure and transparent mechanism of data 
sharing among an unlimited number of members. Liav Orgad has written a powerful contribution 
about the promise of blockchain technology. I fully share his thoughts and his optimism. Blockchain 
participants are able to interact, share information, collaborate and have access to an incredible amount 
of information organised in blocks without the intervention of a centralised authority and without any 
reliance on a centralised platform. More importantly, everyone’s copy of the distributed database will 
be kept updated and will be immutable; information can be added by any member of the global 
network, but cannot be deleted. Blockchain is thus a platform for worldwide information sharing, 
interaction and collaboration. As such, it has the potential to enhance political participation, trigger 
civic mobilisation and to provide the substratum for public action on a global scale.  
Such a bottom up, participatory and size-neutral (the network could consist of billions of people) 
digital network does not merely offer a glimpse of what might be possible in terms of global 
citizenship but, as Liav Orgad has explained, casts doubts on any arguments about the impossibility of 
global citizenship. This is because blockchain simply removes three of the main obstacles for its 
realisation; namely, the impermeability of state borders, the size of the demos, and certain costs 
associated with political participation. Participants just need to have internet access in order to join a 
network comprising millions of citizens from diverse regions and remote locations of the globe who 
could be mobilised in influencing public policies and taking part in public actions.  
In what follows, I will thus sidestep questions about the feasibility of global citizenship in order to 
examine how the new technological revolution will lead to innovations in political life and will create 
Hannah Arendt’s public spaces of ‘virtual’ citizenship. By so doing, I take it for granted that 
blockchain is a ‘game-changer’ and that it could have significant transformative effects on societies, 
politics and citizenship. I use the verb ‘could’ because I do not wish to embrace determinism or to 
imply the existence of a causal relation between technology and political processes. Blockchain has 
the potential to transform the way we think about public spaces, citizenship and political participation, 
but this potential can only be realised if technology is put to uses which can enhance democratic 
political processes.  
My critics might object here that we do not need technological advancements in order to procure 
new conceptions of public space. Analyses informed by the thinking of philosophers, such as Henri 
Lefebvre, and geographers, such as Doreen Massey and Edward Soja, have highlighted that spaces are 
not given but are constructed in different ways by politics and discursive practices. Readers might 
recall Peter Maier’s anthology on the changing boundaries of the political in the late 1980s.1 In it, 
Maier mapped the blurring of the distinction between the state and civil society, while a few years 
later, Gilles Deleuze commented on the shifting of borders and the proliferation of political spaces 
within contemporary societies of control.
2
  
While all this is true, blockchain promises to realise those ideas in unprecedented ways. It also 
holds the promise of generating huge publics beyond (and across) geographical borders and 
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territorially defined communities and thus of opening up new citizenship spaces. Rainer Bauöock and 
Peter Spiro have noted this in their contributions. Citizenship relies on the existence of public spaces 
of communication, of exchange of ideas, arguments and contested viewpoints and of joint decision-
making. For a significant period of time, the agoras of the direct democratic experimentation in 
ancient Athens became remnants of a distant past that had no chance to be replicated in the present and 
future. Now, virtual agoras ‘containing’ millions of active and activist individuals can be built onto 
blockchain.
3
 The mythical space of a distant past becomes connected with, and re-enacted within, the 
contemporary world of an embodied digital network that makes citizenship a network good.
4
  
This is essentially the realisation of Hannah Arendt’s conception of ‘virtual’ public spaces. Virtual 
‘agoras’ built on blockchain will become shared common worlds of continuous flows of speech and 
action, that is, spaces where people would recognise one another as equals or at least equally entitled 
to express their views, to ‘deal only with one’s peers’ and to decide on common actions at national, 
international and global levels.
5
 As Arendt had eloquently noted, the (public) space of speech and 
action ‘can find its proper location almost any time and anywhere’.6 By transcending topological as 
well as institutional accounts of the ‘public space’, blockchain technology not only lends credence to 
Arendt’s conception of public space, but it also promises to open up decentralised public spaces in 
which all participants can be contributors, deciders and holders of institutional memories. The 
participants’ geographical location does not matter. In an unprecedented border-transcending move, 
new spaces of citizenship appear ‘almost any time and anywhere’ as Arendt had argued. What ties all 
the blockchain participants together in the virtual public space of citizenship is simply their ongoing 
concern and active engagement.
7
 These are, in reality, the characteristics that sustain all communities, 
be they virtual or not: members are visibly concerned about the common state of affairs and want their 
claims, needs, and aspirations to be heard.  
This development can bring about a complete reconceptualisation of the nature of international 
society; non-statist ways of defining it will gain prominence. Hedley Bull’s envisaged transformation 
of international society from a society of states to a society of peoples will be progressively realised.
8
 
Cloud agoras will also prompt a rethinking of communitarian ways of defining communities and 
international society which see society and culture as interlocked. This is because they do not rely on 
some form of cultural homogeneity or conformity to a majority’s ideas and narratives; the rely, 
instead, on the coming together of strangers
9
 in order to share their concerns and information, express 
their interests, make demands on the political system and to articulate proposals for common action. 
All this is bound to give rise to interesting questions about ways of constructing political order and 
legitimacy in international relations and politics.  
While cloud agoras have the potential of dislocating citizenship from its statist reference point and 
stimulating citizen involvement by delivering the affirmative requirements for an active citizenry, 
namely, information sharing, the exchange of ideas and preferences, capability for action and the 
means of exerting influence and pressure, they will not be able to resolve the ‘problem of equality of 
voice’. Claude Lefort, Nancy Fraser, Jürgen Habermas and others have commented on the inequalities 
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that persist in democratic public spheres. Some voices will be louder and more influential than others 
and women will always struggle to find time to engage even virtually. Socio-economic disparities 
measured in terms of education, income and occupation will also allow certain participants to easily 
convert their possessed resources into political involvement. The cognitive and linguistic skills for 
political articulations and activity are not uniformly distributed. Nor do they exist independently of 
individuals’ socio-economic setting and geographical location across the globe. Peter Spiro, Lea Yip 
and Stefania Milan correctly highlight this problem. Cloud agoras therefore will not be able to 
transcend the difficulties of ensuring full inclusion in the open public grid. They will certainly be more 
inclusionary that the existing publics, but they will still represent a stratified model of political 
community or public space(s). They will also have their own ‘spinners’, exploiters and manipulators 
of public opinion. I recall Jean Mansbridge’s observations about the dark world of domination and 
manufactured invisibility of actors underpinning deliberative democracy.
10
  
Although it is true that participatory parity cannot be easily achieved even in cloud agoras, it is 
equally true that the common world of citizenship beyond borders, states and nations could be more 
activist. And this is good news for democracy in general. It would be relatively easy for millions of 
blockchain members to mobilise on specific issues and to demand change in law and policy regionally, 
nationally and globally. It would also be more difficult for decision-making elites to ignore the voices 
of so many people and to pretend that they do not count or that their claims do not matter. Civic 
awakenings and political mobilisations in cloud agoras are also likely to exert influence on other 
public spaces that are more conventional and delineated across national and statist lines. For the 
boundaries of public spaces, virtual and non-virtual ones, will always be porous and issues will leak 
from one domain to another. The dawn of global citizenship will thus be a combination of the 
activation of an international or global society and of a more activist citizenship. Virtual global 
citizenship promises to be more virtual, in the republican sense; citizens will continually question 
aspects of public life, make public disclosures of wrongdoing, take an active part in public affairs and 
engage in regular, assertive action.  
That this is good news for citizenship, democracy and politics in general cannot be denied. The 
virtual public space of blockchain communities will make citizens think, engage and act more 
virtually. In other words, the virtual reality of clould agoras will have an impact on institutions and the 
participants themselves; it will yield pressures for more open, transparent and accountable institutions 
and will result in more virtuous, that is, actively engaged, citizens. Whether cloud agoras will prove to 
be decisive public spaces and strong promoters of democratic processes that make wealth, power and 
privilege accountable or merely subaltern counter publics will depend on the intentions and actions of 
their participants. In other words, the answer to the question whether the virtual public space of global 
citizenship will have a decisive influence on global, regional and national public policy-making is not 
theoretical or scholarly; it will be a contextual one.  
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The fascinating discussion kicked-off by Liav Orgad addresses the interplay between the clouds and 
earth: How do cloud citizens and cloud communities relate to their earthly counterparts? 
Arguments by Orgad, Primavera De Filippi, Francesca Strumia, Peter Spiro and Dora 
Kostakopoulou espouse the potential benefits of global citizenship, ordained by the clouds, and cloud 
communities that such global citizens can form, inhabit and govern. Counterarguments by Rainer 
Bauböck, Robert Post, Michael Blake, Costica Dumbrava, Yussef Al Tamimi, Jelena Dzankic, Lea 
Ypi and Dimitry Kochenov suggest that what happens in the cloud stays in the cloud, and may not be 
helpful or relevant to, or at least cannot substitute for, earthly dominions, due to fundamental 
differences between the two. I will try to counter these counterarguments. 
A key introductory point made by Bauböckk is that Orgad ‘must have some form of global federal 
democracy in mind’, yet that ‘his main vision is, however, the emergence of alternative forms of 
political community at the sub-global level’. It is this main vision of Orgad that much of the weighty 
and thoughtful criticism is directed at.  
To address it, I recall a strategy from mathematics: When faced with a difficult problem, namely a 
difficult theorem to prove, turn it into an even bigger problem: Define a more general and broader 
theorem, prove it, and then the original theorem easily follows as a corollary. This seemingly-
paradoxical strategy works sometimes since a higher vantage point may offer a clearer view of the 
crux of the matter. I try to apply this strategy here: I will not address criticisms directed at sub-global 
political cloud communities directly. Instead, I will paint a vision of a global democracy, enabled by 
the internet and the emerging technologies of blockchain and cryptocurrencies, explain how subsidiary 
communities based on shared territory or common interests, as envisioned by Orgad, can emerge and 
operate within it, and respond to criticism from this broader and more encompassing perspective.  
From the outset, key criticisms that apply to subsidiary cloud communities do not apply to a global 
democracy, whether on or off the cloud (we note in parenthesis the respective critics): It has a clear 
territory (Bauböck, Post, Blake, Al Tamimi) – Planet Earth; it has diverse membership (Bauböck, 
Blake) – humanity at large; membership is involuntary (Bauböck, Post, Al Tamimi, Ypi) and by 
decree – just as earthly states conscript citizens by decree; it has room for political communities ‘that 
differ profoundly in their interests, identities and ideas about the common good’ (Bauböck, Al 
Tamimi); and, due to all the above, it is clearly political (Bauböck, Post, Blake, Al Tamimi). Key 
remaining criticisms not answered by generalising the vision to incorporate all of humanity are those 
related to the use of coercion in community governance (Bauböck, Post, Blake, Dumbrava, Al 
Tamimi), lack of inclusivity (Ypi and Kochenov), and the risks of new technology (Dumbrava), which 
I will answer now in turn. 
For our envisioned global democracy to be worthy of its name, it must uphold democratic values
1
, 
including sovereignty, equality, freedom of assembly, the subsidiarity principle, transparency, and the 
conservation of the natural and imprescriptible human rights: liberty, property, safety and resistance 
against oppression.
2
  
A fundamental advantage of blockchain technology is that it is the only technology to date that can 
uphold sovereignty: The multitudes participating in the operation of the blockchain are its sovereign; 
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no member, third party or outside entity has omnipotent ‘super user’ or ‘administrator’ capabilities 
over the system, and no-one can pull the plug on it: it will survive as long as there are interconnected 
participants who are able and willing to continue its operation.
3
 Hence, the answer to Stefania Milan’s 
question, ‘do we really need the blockchain to enable the emergence of cloud communities?’, is: Yes, 
if we want cloud communities to be sovereign and not subservient. 
The situation is not as rosy with equality. Governance trepidations of the ‘cloud communities’ of 
the leading cryptocurrencies, Bitcoin and Ethereum, which consist of their developers, miners and 
owners, resulted in community breakups termed ‘hard forks’. Hence, second- and third-generation 
cryptocurrencies attempt to address their self-governance from first principles.
4
 However, they offer 
only plutocratic solutions,
5
 espousing ‘one coin – one vote’ instead of the ‘one person – one vote’ 
principle necessary for equality. It may be ironic, given the thrust of our discussion, that the only 
approach available today to realize equality on the blockchain is to piggyback on identities issued by 
earthly governments. Besides defeating the purpose of freeing cloud communities from the grasp of 
their earthly counterparts, this approach cannot mix and match governments or identity-granting 
authorities, lest people with multiple government-issued identities have multiple votes in the cloud; 
and it excludes people, such as refugees, who may be hard pressed to present a government-issued 
identity. 
Realising truthful, unique and persistent global digital identities for all, a precondition for making 
an egalitarian blockchain, is a major open challenge.
6
 But, for the sake of the vision we wish to paint, 
please suspend disbelief and assume that: (i) a worthy method for granting global digital identities to 
all has been devised, allowing any individual to claim a global identity (which functions as the 
‘attested individual identities’ Kochenov aspires for); call the rightful owners of such global identities 
global citizens; (ii) unhindered internet access has been globally recognised as a basic civil right and is 
provided, directly or via a proxy, to any individual wishing to become a global citizen. While disbelief 
regarding the first assumption could be discharged in a decade, the second one llww take wegnol. 
However, stating the goal of universal access as a basic civil right, taking concrete steps to implement 
it effectively, and making interim amends to compensate for its temporary lack, are all essential for 
our vision to be legitimate (and to address the justified criticisms of exclusion by Ypi and Kochenov). 
With this in mind, let us explore the vision of bringing about a global democracy of global citizens.  
As much as disbelief is suspended, a method for granting global digital identities will never be 
perfect. Hence, the global democracy will have to grapple with fraud (fake, duplicate and stolen 
identities, Sybil attacks), extortion (the $5 wrench attack) and negligence (lost/forgotten password). 
Resolving such matters with due process would require a court. Such a court would need to rule 
according to a constitution. And the operation of the court (populated most likely by a combination of 
people and machines) will have to be financed. So we have hardly left the doorstep in our journey 
towards a global cloud democracy, and already discovered that in order to realise equality we need a 
global court, a global constitution, and a global currency. 
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That the global democracy needs a currency immediately suggests a cryptocurrency. But, how can 
we entrust the future of humanity to the hands of an environmentally-harmful
7
, plutocratic regime? 
The answer is of fundamental importance: Current cryptocurrencies were architected on the premise 
that participants are anonymous and trustless, and resorted to the deliberately wasteful (Milan) proof-
of-work protocol to cope with trustlessness. If indeed we have a mechanism for granting truthful and 
unique global digital identities that is reasonably resilient to attacks (e.g. at most one third of the 
global identities are compromised at any time)
8
 then the global democracy can deploy an egalitarian 
and planet-friendly cryptocurrency with a democratic governance regime; let’s call such a 
cryptocurrency a democratic cryptocurrency. 
Let’s take stock: We have a democratic cryptocurrency governed by sovereign global citizens that 
are subject to a global court that rules according to a global constitution and is financed by the 
democratic cryptocurrency. This may sound a bit circular, but that’s exactly how earthly states finance 
their operation. For example, the democratic cryptoeconomy can be fuelled by a universal basic 
income to all global citizens.
9
 Income, wealth and transactions could be taxed, progressively if the 
global democracy decides so. Tax revenues would be disbursed to finance the operation of the global 
democracy, in particular the court and the underlying computational infrastructure (‘mining’), as well 
as other purposes, according to a democratically-formed budget.
10
 To prevent speculative 
manipulation of the exchange rate of the democratic cryptocurrency, a global central bank may be 
established, with authority to purchase and sell foreign (crypto)currency to hinder such manipulations; 
the bank can similarly set an interest rate. The constitution will have to be updated as the global 
democracy develops, and subsidiary legislation will have to be adopted. So, in just a few short 
paragraphs we have come to realise that the global citizens of a global cloud democracy that has its 
own cryptocurrency and cryptoeconomy will have to recreate almost all the functions of earthly states; 
let’s call this resulting specific vision a global cryptodemocracy, to distinguish it from the more 
general and abstract idea of a global democracy. If successful, it would show that a technology built 
with an ‘underlying philosophy of distributed consensus, open source, transparency and community’ 
can be both ‘highly disruptive’ and ‘serve similar purposes as those of states’ (Milan); and it could 
achieve that without a reliance on the private sector and corporate capital that would necessitate 
paying undue attention to their interests and lobbying (Milan). 
Additional key criticisms concern the ability of our global cryptodemocracy to protect human 
rights (Bauböck, Blake, Kochenov), collect taxes (Bauböck, Post) and in general enforce the rule of 
the law, given that physical coercion is possible on earth but not in the clouds (Bauböck, Post, Blake, 
Dumbrava, Al Tamimi). To redress crimes against global identities, we propose that global identities 
be realised as programmable software agents, aka ‘smart contracts’, programmed to obey certified 
court orders. Thus, coercion is achieved through design and programmability, without violence: If the 
court determines a global identity to be fake, then it can directly order it to terminate; if determined to 
be a duplicate, then it can be ordered to merge into another identity, and if stolen then to change its 
owner. Regarding Milan’s observation that ‘activism today is characterised by […] a tendency to 
privilege flexible, multiple identities’, we cannot hold the stick at both ends: aspire for egalitarian rule 
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of law in a global democracy, and undermine it with flexible (and hence unaccountable) and multiple 
(and hence unfairly privileged) identities. 
We propose to integrate the global citizen’s global identity with her democratic cryptocurrency 
wallet into one entity, termed global persona. A global persona is the global citizen’s proxy in the 
cloud: it is entrusted with the global citizen’s identity information and crypto-assets, and it performs 
financial transactions and civic duties in the global cryptodemocracy on behalf of the global citizen it 
represents. Being unique and persistent makes a global persona accountable for the global citizen it 
represents. Hence, in addition to the court orders described above, a court may also issue fines against 
a global persona, payable immediately from her wallet, or deducted from her future (universal basic) 
income. As the global persona is programmed to obey court orders, no force is needed to collect such 
fines either. Income, wealth and transaction taxes can be similarly collected without the use of force, 
by programming global personas to obey the (democratically instituted) tax rules that are in effect. Of 
course, the court must be open to appeals on any decision and transaction.  
A key remaining criticism relates to relying on and overseeing the technologies that will underlie 
our envisioned global cryptodemocracy (Post, Dumbrava). The criticism is valid, but is mostly equally 
valid of any technology on which humanity depends today, and there are many. Perhaps one key 
technological vulnerability is related to the democratic process itself, ensuring that elections and more 
generally voting on the blockchain at least stand up to earthly standards.
11
 Regarding overseeing 
blockchain technology, blockchain governance is indeed an issue of active research and 
experimentation, with the recognition that a change of underlying technology of a blockchain is as 
akin to, and as grave as, a change of constitution in a democracy. The global cryptodemocracy would 
employ the constitutional approach to its core technology, allowing constitutional change by its 
sovereign global citizens via a democratic process. Such a process must dampen the immediacy of 
internet communication, lest mob dynamics may rule, by employing hysteresis measures such as 
special majority requirements.
12
 Recovery mechanisms would also be established, and invoked, by 
democratic decision. 
Let us now consider Orgad’s vision of multiple cloud communities with a shared concern or 
ascriptive, thematic or geographic memberships ‘whose aim is political decision-making and in which 
individuals take part in a process of governance and the creation of law.’  
First, we note that all these communities can be subsidiary communities of the global 
cryptodemocracy, potentially with multiple levels of hierarchy (e.g. subsidiary animal rights or Bahá'í 
communities, with their own subsidiary communities based on country of residence); that the ability to 
form them is a manifestation of freedom of assembly in the clouds; and that allowing them to conduct 
their affairs without outside intervention is in line with the subsidiarity principle.  
Second, such communities, within the context of a functioning global cryptodemocracy, may have 
at least one clear political goal: To draft and promote, within the parent global cryptodemocracy, 
policy and legislation that pertain to the rights and goals of their (possibly minority) community 
members. Recall the second article of the 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen: ‘The 
goal of any political association is the conservation of the natural and imprescriptible rights of man. 
These rights are liberty, property, safety and resistance against oppression’. To uphold these, the 
conduct of all subsidiary cloud communities must be transparent in order to ensure that no subsidiary 
community aims to harm the liberty, property or safety of other communities or global citizens. 
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Third, within these rich and multi-faceted cloud communities, a virtual punishment with a global 
scope against one’s global persona, e.g. temporary suspension or even just a public reprimand, applied 
to all subsidiary cloud communities, would be severe indeed. Hence, the higher the value of the 
subsidiary cloud communities to peoples’ lives, the mightier the coercive power of the global 
cryptodemocracy. 
While we have implicitly assumed an egalitarian, democratic decision-making process at the core 
of global cryptodemocracy and in its subsidiary communities that will choose to adopt it, we have not 
specified this process. Such a mechanism faces many challenges, including ‘tyranny of 
structurelessness’, ‘tyranny of emotions’, decision-making by ‘microconsensus’ within small cliques 
(Milan) and many others. The question of how to best reach a democratic decision has been 
investigated sporadically for centuries (e.g. by Llull, Condorcet, Borda), and intensively for the last 70 
years within Social Choice theory. Much theory was developed, much confusion was sowed, and 
confidence in democracy has eroded, mainly due to Arrow’s impossibility theorem and its follow-on 
work. I will just hint that adding a taste for reality to social choice theory can undo much of this 
damage and restore trust in democratic decision making, on and off the cloud.
13
 
I have aimed to show that a vision of a global cryptodemocracy, with a rich set of subsidiary cloud 
communities, is realisable and have tried to address many of the criticisms raised in this debate. But, 
even if a global cryptodemocracy is realisable, and successfully addresses criticism, is it desirable? 
My personal answer is positive for two reasons: First, I believe that, since the days of Kant and even 
before,
14
 the proponents of a world government own the moral high ground, and the weakness of their 
position was practical: Until now, for a world government to materialise, local governments have to 
volunteer to cease some of their power; and giving up of power is not known to happen voluntarily. 
Fortunately, earthly democracies are sufficiently free so that the formation of a global 
cryptodemocracy does not require their consent. True, dictatorial regimes may prevent their citizens 
from participating, but this would, eventually, be at their own peril, as the interests of their people will 
not be represented as well. And true, the full power of a global cryptodemocracy will not be realised 
until proponents of global democracy become majorities in the majority of their respective earthly 
states. Yet, embryonic as it may be, the global cryptodemocracy vision presented here may very well 
be the only concrete proposal towards the ultimate realisation of a global democratic government 
based on currently available technologies. 
And this relates to my second reason. I believe that for representative democracies to rebounce 
from their worldwide decline, they should undergo a major revision and adopt the practices of one of 
the oldest and most successful democracies in the world, namely the Swiss federal direct democracy. 
Given that those in power never give it up voluntarily, and that direct democracy disempowers 
representatives, such a major shift cannot happen without a major outside force in its favor. And new 
technology can offer such a force. In particular, political e-parties, formed as subsidiary cloud 
communities of the global cryptodemocracy, sharing the same technology and networking to share 
winning practices and methods, may be able to win earthly elections and change earthly democracies 
for the better. This in turn may result in such earthly democracies officially supporting
15
 the global 
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cryptodemocracy in its rise into a bona fide egalitarian democratic world government of all global 
citizens.
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The Future of Citizenship: Global and Digital 
A Rejoinder 
Liav Orgad
*1 
This has been an insightful discussion that touches upon some of the most fundamental concepts in 
political theory – communities, states, citizenship, and sovereignty. New technologies challenge the 
meaning and essence of these terms and blur the lines between physical and digital, local and global. 
The nature of the transformation is still a puzzle, but sooner rather than later the ‘Fourth Industrial 
Revolution’ will reach the institution of citizenship. The possible effects are promising but, as this 
GLOBALCIT debate shows, scary too. 
My celebration of the potential of blockchain technologies to advance the idea of global citizenship 
lost in the GLOBALCIT digital agora, at least if we count ‘votes.’ There are four firm supporters 
(Primavera De Filippi, Francesca Strumia, Dora Kostakopoulou, Ehud Shapiro), five strong objectors 
(Robert Post, Michael Blake, Peter Spiro, Lea Ypi, Dimitry Kochenov), and five people who are 
somewhere in between, acknowledging the potential yet expressing concerns (Rainer Bauböck, 
Costica Dumbrava, Yussef Al Tamimi, Jelena Dzankic, Stefania Milan). The objections are wide – 
theoretical and practical, empirical and normative, methodological and conceptual. The idea of 
blockchain-based global citizenship, which can lead to the development of cloud communities that 
seek to take part in international decision making, is seen as ‘techno-utopianism’ (Milan), ‘escapism’ 
(Kochenov), and ‘exclusion[ary]’ (Ypi), a risk to ‘territorial democracy’ (Bauböck) that may bring a 
‘world without law’ (Post) and ‘legitimate coercion’ that is so essential for the protection of human 
rights (Blake). 
My kick-off had several premises. When discussing the need for an international legal persona for 
all human beings, I indicated three fundamental problems: human rights concerns (1.1 billion people 
do not have an official identification), lack of self-governance (individuals have no direct voice in 
international law-making), and unequal representation (the principle of ‘one-state, one-vote’ leads to 
disparities in individual voting power). I identified three developments – the rise of global 
interconnectedness, identity, and responsibility – that, taken together, can end up with the creation of 
an international legal persona and digital identity (as a form of ‘global citizenship’), thereby mitigating 
some of these problems. I also indicated one possible outcome of global citizenship – the emergence 
of (top-down and bottom-up) decentralised ‘cloud communities’ in which global citizens, sharing a 
common bond, can be politically organised and collaborate with the purpose of influencing 
international decision making and, eventually, becoming part of it. The authors in this debate have not 
addressed the premises, yet challenged my observations (e.g., global interconnectedness) and my 
conclusion – the potential of global digital citizenship to do more good than harm. I cannot do justice 
to all the subtle replies, so let me first express my gratefulness to the participants – this has been 
enriching experience, although it has not changed my optimistic view – and briefly address below 
some issues that I see as central. 
Cloud computing 
A large percentage of humanity is already engaged with some forms of cloud computing on a daily 
basis. Whenever you use Google Drive, Apple iCloud, and Dropbox, you spend time ‘in the cloud.’ 
Whenever you use audio and video streaming, online storage, and mobile services, you are ‘in the 
cloud.’ Government services, research data, medical records, and consumer services are available ‘in 
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the cloud.’ Social networks too are ‘in the cloud.’ I have never physically met most of the authors who 
contributed to this debate, but I meet them on a daily basis on Facebook. The reason why we call these 
digital structures ‘cloud’ is not due to the lack of territory – the hardware is located somewhere – but 
because territory is largely irrelevant for the user and the service. 
Cloud computing does not create, in and of itself, a ‘community’ (Post, Spiro), let alone a political 
community (Blake). Facebook is a social network, not a political community. It is commercial and 
dictatorial – members have no common bond and cannot create law or engage in governance – and it 
does not guarantee a truthful unique identity. Yet, in recent years there have been attempts to create 
cloud-based ‘communities’ by using blockchain and other technologies. This started as private 
initiatives, such as Bitnation, but spread into government initiatives, as illustrated by Estonia’s e-
residency. True, e-Estonia is far from creating a ‘community’; Estonia’s e-residents do not interact 
with one another or cooperate for political purposes. They are a group of clients more than a 
sovereign. It is also true that the notion of DBVNs (Decentralized Borderless Voluntary Nations), 
where anyone can build a ‘community’ in a Pangea jurisdiction – an IKEA-style do-it-yourself nation 
– is unrealistic and undesirable. Still, the idea of a political community in which territory is largely 
irrelevant for certain political functions is worth considering. Thus far, it has been regarded as radical 
because it was promoted by anarchists and like-minded people looking for disruptive technologies to 
replace the nation-state. But as technology becomes more developed, it is just a matter of time until 
the idea will crystallise. 
Political community 
Even if the idea crystallises, can we really call cloud networks a ‘political community,’ or would 
they be like a ‘community of video gamers,’ to use Spiro’s analogy, or just an addition to global civil 
society (Bauböck, Post, Milan)? The essence of the community I envision is indeed political, having 
members who share a common bond (say, the protection of animal rights) and seek to become part of 
national (and mainly international) decision making. There are similarities between cloud communities 
and global civil society (Bauböck, Post, Milan) as they are both voluntary, political in nature, civil (in 
the sense of non-governmental), and usually non-profit. But there are some differences. The global 
civil society is not composed of sovereign political entities where decision making is based on a ‘one 
person, one vote’ principle; global civil society organisations are acting on behalf of a group, while 
decentralised cloud communities can form themselves democratic collectives acting on a global scale. 
Do cloud communities merit being called ‘political communities’? It depends on the nature of such 
a community and how it will be developed. At least three components should come together: 1) 
members should have a self-perception as belonging to a collective entity, a shared consciousness of 
forming a political community; 2) members should have political relations and act with a collective 
responsibility; 3) members should be capable of acting collectively with regard to some functions. 
Take immigrants, for example. If all international migrants – more than 250 million people in 2017 – 
joined a virtual community, it would be the world’s fifth largest ‘country’ (after China, India, USA, 
and Indonesia). It could act as a self-governed collective at the international level, negotiating with 
states and UN agencies, collecting taxes, and promoting immigrant rights worldwide – all based not on 
representatives or NGOs, but on direct decision-making by its members. 
Digital coercion 
What about coercion – how can there be a political community without a recourse to force (Bauböck, 
Post, Blake, Dumbrava)? Normatively, the coercive force of law can be independent of the state or its 
territory; it requires authority. Such authority exists also in a blockchain-based community with one 
main difference – it is decentralised. If, for example, the ‘migrant cloud community’ decides 
collectively to stop migration to a certain country that does not respect migrants’ rights or to buy 
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products from certain retailers, and a migrant who is a member violates the rules, s/he can be 
sanctioned (through fines, suspension, limited access to rights/data, or termination of membership). As 
long as membership provides some benefits, particularly the ability to influence and shape decisions 
that affect the member’s life, these sanctions are not minor or trivial. 
Technologically, since membership is virtual, coercion is realised via software. As Shapiro notes, 
one’s virtual identity (or ‘global persona’) is programmed to obey the community’s decisions 
(‘coercion is achieved through design and programmability, without violence’). In fact, state laws 
represent ‘weak coercion’; there are papers that set rules (e.g., a prohibition of murder or crossing a 
red light) and one decides whether to follow the rules or violate them, in this case there are 
punishments and sanctions. Internet protocols are one step further. They are a form of ‘strong 
coercion’; internet codes (e.g., restrictions and blockings) are stronger than papers because the law of 
the software is more difficult to violate – it is not in the discretion of an individual but requires 
knowledge and effort. A digital society represents a form of ‘absolute coercion.’ Transaction 
monitoring (e.g., voting, tax, or registry) is governed by blockchain rules that one cannot violate.  
Socially, ‘punishment’ in a digital society is of a different type. A person cannot be sent to jail, but 
her reputation can be discredited. In the digital era, reputation capital is a valuable asset and a factor 
for providing services and products (think of Airbnb, Uber, eBay). In other words, online reputation 
has a real-world value. As Al Tamimi observes, ‘A punishment in terms of such social devaluation 
imposed by the cloud state is conceivably more painful and restricting to the individual than traditional 
methods of punishment, such as fines or jail.’ 
Functional sovereignty 
The territorial dimension of states has been seen central to citizenship (Bauböck, Post, Blake). Indeed, 
territory is considered the state’s most characteristic feature; states are, by definition (Article 
1, Montevideo Convention, 1933
2
), territorial units. Territory is considered necessary for assuming 
most of the normative functions of the state – for instance, as a source of security and identity, and for 
managing natural resources. Against this background, the concept of a deterritorialised state – or cloud 
communities that would replace the state and fulfil all of its functions – is politically inconceivable. 
But this does not entail that none of the state’s essential functions can be reconceptualised. Cloud 
communities are not a state-replacement, but an improvement – they seek to add a circle to the already 
dynamic and multi-layered rich dimensions of citizenship. They are not supposed to act in the physical 
world – and thus have no sovereignty on issues like murder (Post) – but to govern the transaction of 
values or data that exist in the digital world (voting, registries, certificates, etc.). However, as cloud 
communities become politically more important, what happens there will not remain confined to the 
cloud but influence real-world political decision-making. 
The idea of ‘concentric circles’ of citizenship – to use Cicero metaphor – with each circle having a 
different normative function, is not foreign to the theory of sovereignty. There are three options: cloud 
communities can be seen as sub-sovereign entities, semi/quasi-sovereign entities, or functional 
sovereign entities. Let me focus on the third option – functional sovereignty. Under this approach, 
sovereignty is divided by functions, with each being governed by a different entity. Think of federal 
systems, a condominium of states, mandate/trusteeship, autonomy (e.g., Quebec or Puerto Rico), or 
municipalities (where certain functions are governed by local sovereignty). Divisible sovereignty can 
be exercised over territories – e.g. Andorra, which was a condominium before independence in 1993 
and still had two heads of state (the French president and a Catalan bishop) – or peoples. Sovereignty 
can be divided between political entities, as in federations or in the European Union, or between 
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political and nonpolitical entities – think of religion (in Israeli law, for example, religious law is 
sovereign in family issues). The idea of functional sovereignty, as coined by Willem Riphagen in 
1975,
3
 enables entity A to have sovereignty over social welfare, entity B to be the sovereign on 
financial issues, and entity C to enjoy sovereignty over security – all in the same territory. It also 
makes it possible for different political authorities to exercise functional sovereignty over different 
peoples in the same space. The switch is from a jurisdiction over territories to a jurisdiction over 
functions, peoples and services. As this is not a new concept, we can understand how it could be 
applied to blockchain-based cloud communities as well. 
The normative functions of cloud communities remain an open question in the debate. My focus 
has been on global topics – global warming, the environment, and other issues of global sustainability 
– but it is for the states to decide which functions to delegate to self-sovereign communities. 
Ultimately, states would set the boundaries and decide the sensitive areas in which sovereignty 
cannot/should not be divided or shared. 
Coda 
We can construct theoretical models of digital citizenship but, as this debate has shown, there are 
plenty of uncertainties – political, technological, and psychological ones – before it can become 
actually operative. I agree with Milan that ‘much work is needed . . . before we can proclaim the 
blockchain revolution.’ In particular, I share the concern about global inequality generated by ideas of 
cloud communities due to lack of internet access (Dzankic, Ypi, Kochenov) – this gap, however, has 
tremendously (and rapidly) narrowed and in 104 states more than 80 per cent of the youth population 
(aged 15-24) are now online. The situation will further improve if a right to internet access is 
universally recognised. And I cannot but share Bauböck’s worries about the tyranny of the majority in 
the cloud – addressing it is a matter of constitutional design of voting mechanisms (note, however, that 
there will be judicial review, decisions that require supermajority, and perhaps even veto rights in the 
digital world as well). Discussing these (and others) concerns will keep theorists and policy makers 
busy in the years to come. While the focus of this debate is on global citizenship and virtual 
communities, I see it as a broader invitation to reflect on the nexus between new technologies and the 
future of citizenship. 
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